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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of t·1onopoly Power on a 
Commercial Banking Firm 
by 
John Atwood Tribble, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah St at e University, l<:l7S 
Major Professor: Dr. Kenneth Lyon 
Department: Economics 
vii 
The commercial banking industry is oft en criticized on the grounds 
that there is a high concentration of market power in the hands of a 
few f irms. However, the appropriate measure of market power i s Lerner's 
index of monopoly power, the elasticit y of demand, not concentration 
ratios. The theoretical model developed in the paper is designed to 
permit the estimation of demand and supply el ast icities in. the banking 
industry. Specifically , two assets (loans and s tate and local funds) 
and one liability (time deposits) are investigated. 
The empi rical model focuses its attention on the demand and supply 
conditions. If the bank i s a profit maximizer , then the banker adjusts 
t he portfolio of assets and issues of liahilities in accordance with the 
Luler first order maximization conditions of the cxpect e<1 profits 
function. In this func t ion administra tive costs are expressed as a 
proport i on of total assets. Default risks are i gnored . At the optimal 
solution of the Eul er firs t order conditions transaction costs generated 
by deposi t -liabil ity f luctuations are treated as scalers . These simoli -
fying assumpt ions permit the estimation of the slope of the loan demand, 
of t he demand for state and local funds, and of time deposit suoply, 
which can be used to estimate the elasticities of the respective 
functions . 
viii 
The empirical r esults are based on cross-sectional data for 7.89 
standard economic areas in those states where there is an absence of 
ext ens ive branch banking. The ohservations are categorized into eight 
bank classes by per capita income level, by hank density per capita in 
the standard economic area, and hy economic hase (agricultural or non-
agricultural) in the area. It is assumed that the demand and supply 
functions are identical for all banks within a bank class. llsinr, the 
fi r st order maximization conditions as behavioral equations the slopes 
of the supply and demand functions are estimated. These estimates are 
used to calculate elasticities of loan demand, state and local funds 
demand, and time deposit supply. 
In general , it is concluded that those hanks from lm•l income 
a rea s have a lower elasticity of demand for loans than banks jn hjgh 
income areas. These banks have more monopoly power in the loan account. 
The elast icity of deposit supply is low for all classes of hanks. This 
could be due to monopsony power, but it is more likely due to the legal 
ceiling on interest rates paid on time deposits . The analysis does not 
lead to any conclusions for the structural preconditions for the 
existence of monopoly power, but it does indicate that banks jn certain 
markets may have some degree of monopoly power. 
(116 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INI'RODOCTJON 
The regulation of banks and financial institutions is a phenome-
non steeped in the traditions of the west ern worl d . From the ancient 
usury laws enforced by the early church to the government run enter-
prises of the modern world the banking industry has never been free 
from market interference. Tne interference was justified on moral 
grounds, for financial market stability, and eventually for economic 
efficiency. Society's regulation has had two opposing influences on 
banking: one increasing competition and the other decreasing compe-
tition. The essential question of this paper is: do commercial han!cs 
have monopoly power with respect t o loans and monopsony power with 
respect to time deposits. 
The scope and purpose of the study 
l-1arket imperfections may necessitate the regulation of all 
financ ial intermediaries. However, there is one institution that is of 
particular importance, the commercial bank. Commercial bants are dis-
tinctive from all other financial intermediaries i.n that they arc per -
mitted to accept demand deposits. The aggregate volume of demand de-
posits exerts a vast impact on all sectors of the economy and is , there-
fore , a target for government regulations. P<:JWever, much of this regu-
lation i s designed to enhance competition. This paper will address it-
self to exigency of regulation to promote economic efficiency in the 
commercial banking industry. 
The concept of economic efficiency will be treated within the 
framework of market imperfections. Instead of using the traditional 
measures of market structure in the banking industry, (concentration 
ratios, loan-asset ratios, capital-asset ratios), an attempt will he 
made to ascertain whether the existence of monopoly power will cause 
banker's to alter their resource allocation. Monopoly power will he 
interpreted in terms of the elasticity of demand for funds from the hank 
and the elasticity of supply of funds to the bank. A model of the 
operation of a connnerci al bank will be proposed, which includes the 
possibl e existence of monopoly power. If the bank acts as i f it has 
monopoly power, then the conclusion can be drawn that market imper-
fections do in fact alter the allocation of resources and the distri-
bution of product. 
Bank regulations 
Under present conditions commercial banks are subject to regulation 
from three distinct sources. First, since the National Bank Act of 186:> 
the office of the Comptroller of the Curr.ency has had the power to char-
~er qualified institutions as national banks. The Federal Reserve Act 
of 1913 requires all national banks to be members of the Federal Reserve 
System and subject to Federal Reserve regulations. Second, commercial 
banks may be chartered by agencies of various state governments, being 
regulated by state law, and these banks may choose whether or not to 
be members of the Federal Reserve System. Third, all members of the 
Federal Reserve System , whether state or federal charter, have been 
obliged to participate with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
since its creation in 1933. State hanks that are not members of the 
3 
Federal Reserve System are free to choose not to participate with the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The banking industry, as a whole, 
comes under the regulation of the state banking agencies, the Federal 
Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
From these three sources of regulation there arise four potential 
areas 1vhere competition or economic efficiency may he diminished. 1 
First, there may be a restriction of bank entry into the industry . The 
Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, in the waJc.e of monetary panic and concern 
with the problem of "over-banking," empowered the Comptroller of the 
Currency when considering any new charters to certify that he has 
examined the bank's 
future earning prospects ... the convenience and needs of 
the community to be served by the bank.z 
The Federal Reserve Sys tem and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Here given the same guidelines Hhen accepting nelV memhers or issuing 
insurance to new banks. The policy, as stated, was to overtly restrict 
entry if neH firms would dampen the earnings prospects for firms already 
in the industry. 
Second, various state laws prohibit or restrict branch hanking. 
As of 1970 there are nineteen states that permit state-wide branch 
hanking. There are sixteen states where limited area hranch hnnkinJ~ 
prevails. In the remaining fifteen states only unit hanking 
1This r ationale is described in Richard H. Timherlake and Fdward 
B. Selby , Money and Banking (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishinr, Company, 
Inc., 1972), pp. 207-224. 
i s permitted. 3 The law varies from state to state and the practice 
varies even mre widely. Prohibitions of branch banking restricts 
competition and may permit the creation of local monopolies . nn the 
other hand, the existence branch banking allows the growth of banking 
giant s who by their mere size may inhibit competition .4 
Third, there are a variety of limitations placed on earning 
4 
assets . "Country" banks are subject to one set of reserve requirements, 
"reserve city" another, and state chartered banks still other sets. 
Assets are restricted according to the size of the capital accolmt under 
state law or under Regulation H of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Systern. 5 
Finally, there are a variety of limitations placed on interest 
rate payments. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
uses Regulation Q to put a ceiling on rates of interest paid on ti~e 
deposits . State agencies administer various usury laws wh.ich l~it 
interest charged on loans. Both price restrictions and auantity re-
strictions may affect the degree of competition. 
The net effect of the extensive regulation of the financial 
sector is difficult to judge. Clearly, there are various 
desirable social goals that the regulations are desigr.ed 
to further. Unfortunately, there are also cost s associated 
with these regulations. There seems to be mounting 
3Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Sunm7u of Accounts and 
Deposits in i\11 Commercial Banks, National Swnmary une 30, 1970 
(washington, D.C.: f.ederal Deposit Insurance Corporation , 1970), p. 8 . 
4
·rnis paper will not address the branch banking controversy 
specificall y. J\ deta iled discussion of the problem is given in Paul 
M. llorvi t z and Bernard Shull, "The Impact of Branch Banking on Bank-
ing Performance," National Banking Review, 2 (December, 1964), 
143-88. 
5Cf. Chapter IV, p. 60 . 
evidence that the net effect of regulation has been to 
create and sus ta i n monopoly positions r ather than pro -
tect the consumers or the financial system.6 
Recommendations of the rrunt Commission 
Given this structure of extensive regulation from almost all 
levels of government, with its dubious impact on competition and economic 
efficiency , in 1970 President Nixon establ i shed the President's Commission 
on Financial Structure and Regulation, later known as the !-runt Commission. 
The purpose of the commission was to study the operations, regulations, 
and structure of all private financial institutions in the llnited States 
and to propose a series of recommendations that would improve their per-
formance. The following is a list of recornnendations that pertain par -
ticularly to competition. 
The commission recommends: (1) that all controls on interest 
rates paid on non-demand deposits be abolished (except on a standby 
basis for a period of ten years); (2) that financial institutions should 
not be allowed to pay interest on demand deposits; (3) that portfolio 
r estrictions on financial institutions be substantially reduced; (4) 
that savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks he permitted 
to issue demand deposit s and a wider range of liabilities; (5) that 
state laws be changed to encourage statewide branching of all financial 
institutions; (6) that rates on government guaranteed loans (particu-
larly mortgages) be determined by market forces . 7 
6
rhomas R. Saving, "Toward a More Competitive Financial Sectors," 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 4 (November 1972), 897. 
7The Re Structure 
and Regulation rmtmg 
Off1ce, 1971). 
6 
All of these recommendations were designed to enhance competition. 
Fir st, removing all deposit rate restrictions should reduce disinter-
mediation from one group of financial institutions to another 1~hen the 
general l evel of interest rates change. This means that all institu-
tions will compete for deposits on an equal basis. The second recom-
mendation is for the purpose of insuring that the needs of the small 
depositor are met. If interest payments were allowed on demand de-
posits a number of the services now available to small depositors would 
disappear. The third recommendation gives the bank or other financial 
institution a higher degree of autonomy in managing its own portfolio . 
In particular, savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks are 
permitted to purchase a wider range of assets, theoretically reducing 
the amount of risk in their entire portfolio. Also recommended is the 
elimination of geographical restrictions on the residence of borrowers, 
which were designed to insure that local funds were loaned locally. 
lhe fourth recommendation, permitting savings and loan associations and 
mutual savings banks to issue dell'.and deposits, puts these institutions 
in direct competition with commercial banks. The fifth recommendation 
concludes that branch banking enhances competition, instead of diminish-
ing it. Finally, the sixth recommendation, which would remove the ceil-
ing rates on mortgages, will increase mobility of resources in and out 
of the mortgage market. The increased liquidity will improve efficiency 
in the financial sector and reduce the gap between lending and borrowing 
rates of all financial institutions. 8 
8James To hi n, "A c:eneral l'quil ibrium Approach to JV!onetary "lheory ,'" 
.Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking , l (February, 1969), ZR-29 . 
7 
This i s a "set" of recommendations which taken as a 1'>1lole are 
designed to increase competition. Collectively they would tend to cause 
the variety of distinct ive f inancial institutions to beco~e ~ore similar. 
The essential legal differences between commercial bank, savings and loan 
associations , and mutual savings banks would be eliminated , thus increas -
ing the total number of potential competitors in each market. 
Outline of procedures 
If under the present form of hank regulation there are restric-
tions on the degr ee of compet i tion, this should he exhibited in the 
marke t behavior of commercial banks . In particular, it wi l l he reflected 
in the el as tic ity of demand for funds from the banks. Chapter II will 
discuss the various measures of monopoly power and their application in 
banking markets . The chapter will also review the literat ure of banking 
theory and the empirical evidence of bank behavior with particular em-
phasis on models that affect the s tructure of the banking industry . 
Chapter III builds a detailed theoretical model of a commercial 
bank, based on the review of the literature. This model recognizes 
the possible exis tence of monopoly power, but it is compatible with per-
fectly compet itive markets, as well. An empirical model derived ·f rom 
the theor etical model is proposed in Chapter IV . The emnirica l model 
rrovides a testable hypothesi s: that commercial banks ac t as if they 
have monopoly power. Chapter V will empirically t es t whe t her hanks act 
as if t hei r l oan demand and deposit supply functions are less than per-
fectly elastic . Chapter VI summarizes the results and presents the 
conclus i ons . 
8 
CHAJYI'ER II 
REVIEW OF TilE LITERA'IURJ' ON Cct-fv!ERCIAL 
BANKING AND MONOPOLY POWFR 
The literature on commercial bank portfolio determination is wide 
ranging and extensive. This review will be limited to those items that 
are of particular :iJnportance to this study. The review is intended to 
provide the foundation for the development of a theoretical model of com-
mercial bank behavior. It is divided into five sections: (1) the con -
cept of monopoly power; (2) traditional banking theories; (3) monopoly 
theories of banking; (4) empirical evidence of banking monopolies; and 
(5) literature on the appropriate tL~e horizon. 
Monopoly power 
~1onopoly power is the conceptualization of the idea that a busines s 
may have the capabili ty of distorting the allocation of resources from 
their most economically efficient employment, whether that power is exer-
cised or not. It is conmon usage to refer to the "degree of monopoly" 
as a recognition that monopoly power is being exercised. 9 Strictly 
speaking, a monopoly exists 1vhenever one firm is the only seller in a 
well-defined market of a well -defined product. Industries in which 
there are few competitors are said to exhibit some degree of monopoly. 
lnis implies, that while monopoly in the strict sense does not exist , 
9Fritz Machlup, The Political Economy of Monopol y (Baltimore : 
'Inc John Hopkins Press , 1952), pp. 469-528. 
9 
the fi rms are capable of distorting the allocation of resources. Neither 
monopoly power nor degree of monopoly can be measured directly. Since 
they are merely the conceptualization of an idea it is difficult to 
assign a number to measure t heir relative intensities. A number of 
proxies have been suggested . These tend to fall into two classes: (1) 
those that are derived from the cause or structure of monopoly (numbers, 
concentrations, company and plant divergences); and (2) those that are 
derived from the effects of the existence of monopoly (rates of profit, 
price-inflexibility, marginal cost and price differentials , cross 
elasticities of demand). 
The most obvious approach for measuring monopoly would be to count 
the number of firms in the industry. rbwever, this approach quickly 
breaks dmvn due to the difficulty in defining the market. This would be 
particularly true in the banking industry, where the number of firms in 
the nation or in the state may be large, but the larger por tion of the 
deposits is controlled by only a few firms . The alternative is to 
measure the degree of monopoly by the concentration in the industry. 
'[hat is the proportion of output controlled by the largest firm or the 
first four largest firms. But this measure is questionable, also, since 
the number of firms in the nation may be large and each firm relatively 
small, but each firm caters to a small well -defined market. Within this 
market each banking firm could have a great deal of monopoly pmver and 
market control, even though the concentration ratio for the industry as a 
~~ole is low. Another problem with concentration ratios is that firms 
do not produce a single product; instead they produce a variety of pro-
ducts. The firm has to be classified in one industry or another accord-
ing to their major product and won't be counted in other industries in 
10 
which they participate. 10 The use of concentTation ratios as a measure 
of degree of monopoly power in the banking industyY does not appear to 
be pTOmising. 
It is often argued that the most obvious result of monopoly is 
abnormally high profits, and attempts have been made to measure the 
degree of monopoly power in tenns of rates of profits .11 It is recog-
nized that accounting profits are subject to many spurious influences, 
but Bain aruges that profits may be adjusted to a comparable rate. The 
"theoretical rate" would adjust profits and value of "necessaTY net 
assets" to arrive at a rate which could be compared with competitive 
rates of profit as an indication of monopoly power. However, the ad-
justment process 1vould be quHe cl.Dnbersome, and the measure is still 
plagued with some theoretical considerations. For instance, an aunormal 
adjusted rate of profit might be the result of nonnal returns on invest-
mentor of abnonnal returns on "necessary investment." There is no way 
to distinguish between the two. 
Another phenomenon of imperfect competition that might be used to 
measure monopoly power is price inflexibility. 12 Noting that adminis-
tered prices change only infrequently, it is argued that if an industyY 
j s able to stabilize its prices for long periods of time, it is appar-
cntly in" monopolistic position. l'articulurly Juring the llepression 
Concentration of 
. tates (Qvernment 
11Joe S. Bain, "The Profit Rate as a ~Ieasure of Monopoly Power," 
quarterly Journal of Economics, 55 (1941), 271-93. 
12John T. Dunlop, "Price Flexibility and the 'Degree of Monopoly'," 
quarterly Journal of Economics, 47 (1939), 522-33. 
11 
years, those industries whose prices were insensitive to the downward 
pressure of severe recession appeared to exhibit monopoly power. A 
serious defect of this measure is that it fails to account for the possi-
bility of cost inflexibility. Margin flexibility is a measure of price 
flexibility net of variations in direct costs of production. Dunlop com-
pares on a percentage basis price changes with changes in direct cost , 
implying that the ratio of price changes to changes in direct cost 
yields a measure of price flexibility which can be used to measure the 
degree of monopoly. While price inflexibility appears to be a phenome-
non associated with monopoly, its existence is merely a theoretical 
proposition, not a direct result of monopoly. Under certain conditions 
of constant marginal costs for the monopolist this proposition may he-
come a result, but one has no grounds for a;suming constant marginal 
cost. In addition, measuring monopoly power in terms of price inflexi-
bility ignores differences in the variability of demand over time. 
Some monopolist may experience unstable market demands and may therefore 
appear to have relatively high price flexibility, even though they are 
faced with dowmvard sloping demand curves. 
Abba Lerner proceeds directly from the theory of monopoly to a 
measure of the degree of monopoly power. 13 Since the monopolist is 
faced with a downward sloping demand curve price will not be equal to 
111arginaJ cost at the profit maximizing level of output. The relative 
gap between marginal cost and selling price wi ll he a measure of 
monopoly power: 
13Abba P. Lerner, "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of 
Monopoly Power," Review of Economic Studies, 1 (1934), 157-175. 
Lerner 
index 
p - M::: 
p 
If the price is equal to marginal cost the index is equal to zero and 
there is perfect competition . The larger the gap between price and 
12 
marginal cost the closer the index is to one and the greater the degree 
of monopoly power . Lerner's index bears a close relationship to the 
elasticity of demand at the profit maximizing output, where marginal 
cost is equal to marginal revenue: 
elasticity 
of 
demand 
AR 
AR - MR 
(Lerner index)- l 
p 
p - f't: 
The implicat ion is that the less elastic the demand curve the greater 
the degree of monopoly power for the profit maximizing fi rm. 
Another attempt to measure monopoly directly from the demand curves 
was made by K. 1"1 . Rothschild .14 He compares the s lope of the demand 
curve for the firm with the slope of the demand curve for the indust ry. 
lne firm ' s demand curve is defined for this purpose as that pert aining 
when all competing fi rms change prices. The ratio of the s lope of the 
finn ' s demand to the slope of the industry' s demand curve is an index 
of monopoly power . If the ratio is equal to one the firm controls the 
entire market and is a pure monopolist . The more perfectly competitive 
14 K. W. Rothschild, "The Degree of Monopoly," Economica, 9 (1942), 
24-39. 
the finn the closer the ratio approaches zero. Comparing his measure 
with Lerner ' s , Rothschild notes that Lerner's index 
i s probably the ideal measure if we want to deal with problems 
like social cost of monopoly, the allocation of r esources 
under monopoly , the divergence from optimum output, and similar 
ques tions .l 5 
Rothschild 's fonnula gives a better indication of potential monopoly 
power of a finn over an industry. The major weakness of Rothschild's 
13 
proposal arises when there is competition from similar products outside 
of the :indus t ry definition. Here his industry demand curve does not 
indicate total consumer demand. 
Robert Triffin approaches thi s particular problem i n t erms of the 
cross el asticities of demand. 16 If the firm is a pure monopoly, then 
the cross-el ast icity of demand between its product and the products of 
all other finns i s zero. This concept is theoretically appealing, but 
it runs into problems of prac tical application, because cross-elastici-
ties of products of different fi~s cannot be aggregated into a single 
index. 
For the purposes of this paper the most appropriate measure of 
the degree of monopoly i s the Lerner index. This will prove empiri-
cally des irable , as well as , the best theoretical measure available. 
Care has to be taken to avoid overextending the concept of monopoly 
power wjth the Lerner model. Price Theory texts point out the follow -
ing problem: 
15 Ibid., pp. 33-34 . 
16Robert Triffin , Mono (Cambridge, Mass .: J-larv~a~r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Another common misconception is that the demand curve faced 
by a monopolist is inelastic. Most demand curves, with the 
exception of those faced by firms under conditions of pure 
competition, range from highly elastic toward their upper 
ends to highly inelastic toward their lower ends. The 
output that maximizes a monopolist's profits will always be 
within the elastic sector of his demand curve if he has any 
costs of pcoduction . Marginal cost is always positive; 
therefore, at the output at which marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue, marginal revenue must also be positive.l7 
14 
If the monopolist is faced with an upward shifting marginal cost curve, 
he will reduce his output and raise his price, moving up his demand 
curve. In moving from one profit maximizing output to another , the 
elasticity of demand may rise and the Lerner index of monopoly power 
falls. As the firm moves up its demand curve price rises at a slower 
rate than marginal cost (assuming that the firm is maintaining the 
profit maximizing output) and the relative gap between marginal cost 
and price is falling. Even though the monopolist is charging a higher 
price and selling a smaller output the degree of monopoly, as measured 
by the Lerner index, has fallen. The higher prices and smaller quanti-
ties reflect only the rising cost structure. Despite this criticism 
the Lerner index is the best available measure of monopoly power. 
Traditional banking theories 
A commercial bank's basic function i s to act as a financial inter-
mediary. As such, it purchases securities from "ultimate harrowers" 
anti issues indirect debt for the portfolios of "ultimate l enders." 
·nlC bank participates in two distinct markets: a market for primary 
securities and a market for indirect debt. The essential questions 
17Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation, 
Sth ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 234-235. 
which a connnercial bank has to ans1ver are: how much indirect debt 
should it is sue and how much of each type of security should it pur-
chase? 
F. Y. Edgeworth answers that last question by assuming that the 
banker is playing a game of chance: 
Probability is the foundation of banking. The solvency and 
profits of the banker depend upon the probability that he 
will not be called upon to meet at once more than a certain 
amount of his liabilities .... 
I have imagined a new game of chance, which is ]ilayed in 
this manner: each player receives a disposable fund of 100 
counters , part of which he may invest in securities not 
immediately realisable, bearing say 5 per cent. per ten min-
utes ; another portion of the 100 may be held at call, bearing 
interest at 2 per cent . per ten minutes; the remainder is 
kept in the hands of the player as a reserve against certain 
liabilities . The demand which he has to meet is thus regu-
lated . From time to time, say every two minutes , there is 
taken a certain number, say 22, digits at random from the pages 
of some mathematical or statistical table. The sum of these 
digits constitutes the demand which the player must meet. We 
need not consider the provision which is made to meet the 
average amount (99) of the demand . The special object of the 
re serve above mentioned is to provide against demands which ex-
ceed the average. If the player can meet this excess demand 
with his funds in hand, well; but if not he must call in part, 
or all , of the sum placed at call, incurring a forfeit of 
10 per cent. on the amount called in. But if the demand is so 
great that he cannot even thus meet it, then he incurs an 
enormous forfeit, say 100 1. or 1000 1 . The player who 
IVins the most interest IVins the game.l7 
TI1eories of bank portfolio management based on deposit-liability 
f luctuations have been refined, but they are still based on the same 
principles. The forfeiture s can be thought of as transaction costs: 
brokerage costs, penalty payments, possible loss of principle. Bank 
portfolio model s have been developed on the basis or di rrering 
17F. Y. EdgeiVorth, "The Mathematical Theory of Banking," Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society, 51 (March 1888), 113 , 120 . 
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transaction costs being associated with different assets yielding 
different returns. One such model was developed by Kenneth Lyon. 18 
Considering three types of assets: loans, securities, and case, A1 ,A2, 
and A3, respectively, with rates of return i 1 and i 2 (i3=0) and trans-
action costs t 1 and t 2 (t3=0) associated with each asset. The expected 
profits function is the interest earned on each asset if the asset is 
in the portfolio for the full time period minus the interest lost times 
the percent of the time the asset is expected to be absent from the 
portfolio minus the expected transaction costs incurred in moving the 
asset in and out of the portfolio. 
E(P) E(interest earned) E(interest lost) 
(1) 
- E(transaction costs) 
where E is the expectations operator. Letting y (with a ·density f(y)) 
be the random variability of deposits, the probability that some loan 
assets will not be in the portfolio is: 
A 
J 1 (A - y) f(y) dy 
0 1 
1ne probability that some security assets will not be in the portfolio 
is: 
18Kenneth Lyon, "'lneory of Commercial Bank Portfolio Selection: 
'111e Simp! Hied Model," Utah State llniversi ty, unpublished paper. 
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The probability that all of the security assets are out of the portfolio 
is: 
A 
J 1f(y) dy 
0 
These probabilities may be interpreted as the percent of the time the 
assets arc not in the portfolio. 1nerefore, the expected interest 
loss may be expressed as the interest rate times the percent of the 
time assets are expected to be out of the portfolio. 
Transaction costs are incurred whenever the level of assets 
changes, either up or down; "whenever a level of assets below Z i s 
follm;ed by a level of assets above Z"19 or vice versa . Therefore, 
the probability of transacting the Zth asset is the joint probability 
of the two events: 
z 
g(Z) J f(y) dy J f(y) dy 
0 z 
The expected profits function is: 
E(P) 
Al 
-tl J 
() 
19Ibid., p. 7. 
f (Z) tlZ 
Al+Az 
t2 J 
Al 
Al 
izA2 J f(y)dy 0 
g (Z) tl Z 
(2) 
(3) 
18 
Profits are maximized with respect to the three assets and the portfolio 
is allocated in accordance with the first order Euler maximization con-
ditions. The determination of the portfolio is dependent on the random 
variability of deposits, the rates of interest received on loans and 
securities, and the transaction costs of loans and securities. 
Another approach to bank portfolio management is centered around 
the assumption that operating cost differentials are the most signifi-
cant var iable. The cost associated with the "output" of each type of 
product and with the "input" of each type of resource will detennine 
the banks holdings of assets and liabilities. The most difficult problem 
associated with this approach is in defining output: 
In defining variables , there appears to be fair ly general agree-
ment on the relevance of current operating expense - as shown 
in Income and Dividend Statements - as a measur e of cost. 
However , no similar consensus exists with respect to output 
definition. Measures used include total deposits, total assets, 
earning assets, number of loans and deposit accounts, and 
synthetic indexes.20 
George Benston has been the leading researcher in marginal costs 
associated with banking output. llis approach to the output defini tion 
is described as follows: 
For many problems of economic analyses, it is useful to think 
of the amount of loans and investments as product sold, the 
amount of deposits as a factor of production, and the amount 
of operations expenses as a cost of production. However , a 
better measure of bank output for study of the costs of hank-
ing operations [my underline] 1s the number of depos1t 
accounts and loans processed. 
20stuart Greenbaum , "Costs and Production in Commercial Banking," 
~bn thly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, ~~rch­
Aprll, 1966), 13. 
The "work" of a bank consists of transfering funds on 
demand, holding and investing funds for time depositors, and 
making l oans and investments. The operations costs incurred 
are a function of the services performed. Since these ser-
vices are related primarily to the number of deposit account 
and loans processed rather than dollars loaned, economies-of-
scale should be measured against this concept of output.21 
Costs depend on the output mix: the cost of "producing" demand 
deposits, time deposits , mortgage loans, installment loans, business 
loans , and securities. Many of these costs are jointly dependent, 
19 
since the "number" of assets may also affect the ''number" of liabilities. 
Benston's statistical estimates indicate that the marginal cost curves 
for mortgage loans slopes upwards at a decreasing rate; the installment 
loan curve is U-shaped, and the business loan curve is downward slop-
ing. He observes that this is consistent with studies indicating that 
larger banks tend to have a lower proportion of real estate and install-
ment loans-to-total loans and investments, and that for smaller banks 
the proportion of business loans-to- total loans and investments is 
lower. On the liability side, the marginal cost curve associated with 
demand deposi t s is downward sloping and with time deposits the cost 
curves are flat. This is consistent with general observations that 
larger banks tend to issue a larger proportion of demand deposits than 
time deposits. 22 •23 
A third approach to bank portfolio management is to assume that 
each bank determines its optimal portfolio in accordance with 
21George J. Benston , "Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in 
Banking Operations," The National Banking Review, 2 (June 1965), 513. 
22 Ibid., p . 544. 
23Bcnston has recently updated and refined his original work apply-
ing it to savings institutions. "Savings Banking and the Public Inter-
est," Journal of Money, Credit , and Banking, 4 (February, 1972), 133-224. 
20 
regulation and requirements administered by bank examiners. 24 It is 
assumed that each bank knows the volumes of demand and time deposits, 
rates of interest , and the banks net worth. The banker is concerned 
with two basic restrictions: reserve requirements and ''balanced port-
folios." 1he "balanced portfolio" is def ined in terms of "rules-of-
thumb" used by bank examiner s, i.e., upper limits on the ratio of debt 
to net worth , or of total assets to net worth. Bank examiners establish 
a "leverage" function , which is a linear combination of primary and 
secondary reserve, minimum risk assets, intermediate assets, and port -
folio assets (and subsets of these). The "leverage" functions become 
a constraint, or more specifically a series of constraints, defined in 
tenns of the asset variables. The banker maximizes profits subject to 
these constraints over a five-year period time horizon. This linear 
progrannning problem yields the optimal amount of each asset to be held 
in the portfolio. Chambers and Charnes have provided a tool for 
"optimal" portfolio decision making based upon the responsiveness of 
the bankers to bank examiners ' guidelines, but their analysis does not 
answer the question of whether bankers actually behave in this way. 25 
A commercial bank, like all intermediaries, is faced with the 
problem of what kinds of a; sets it is t o hold in its portfolio and what 
combinations of debt issues it is to maintain. II variety of theories 
have been advanced on the basj s of portrolio diversification. 
Edgeworth 1 s and Lyon 1 s models are founded on risk and transaction costs. 
24u. Chambers and A. Charnes, "Inter-Temporal Analysis and 
Optimization of Bank Portfolios," Management Science , 7 (July 1961): 
393-410. 
25 Ibid. 
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Benston' s model of marginal cost is based on the imperfect divisibility 
of assets (with output measured in number of accounts , instead of 
dollars) . Chamber's and Charnes' model is based on the non-financial 
aspects of the portfolio, as they try to conform to bank examiners 
guidelines. It will be a major contention of this paper that a model 
based on price discriminating monopoly power is also of interest . 
Monopoly theories of banking 
With limitations placed on entry into the banking industry and 
restrictions on the establishment of branch banks one would expect that 
the industry would be characterized by some degree of monopoly . Inst ead 
of facing perfectl y elastic demand curves of perfect competition, banks 
appear t o be faced with downward sloping demand curves: 
Individual banks also possess a degree of freedom in deter-
mining the interest rates to be charges on their loans to 
customers. To each bank the demand curve for its loans does 
not appear to be a horizontal line at t he "ruling" market rate 
... an increase in the bank's rate will not lead to a complet e 
disappearance of the demand for its loans any more than a 
reduction of its rate will bring to it an infinite demand . 26 
Based on the number of alternatives that potential borrowers in a 
particular market have available to them , a commercial bank may find 
that its demand curve for a particular type of loan may he downward 
s loping. Bernard Shull and Paul llorvitz in a comparative study of 
banki ng structure defined the appropriate markets as local markets 
26Lester V. Chandler, 'Monopolistic Elements in Commercial 
Banking," Journal of Political Economy, 46 (February, 1938), 4. 
because for the vast majority of banks and bank-borrowers 
and depositors, nei ther the entire United States nor the 
individual st ate represent realistic geographic ~7kets. 
The bank business is principally local in nature. 
Within these local banking markets they conclude that concentration 
ratios are high. However, high concentration ratios are not a suf-
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fic ient condition for t he exi stence of monopoly. Monopoly power implies 
that firms in the industry have demand curves that are less than i nf i -
nitely elastic. 
A monopoly banking model was proposed by Bernard Shul l. He des-
cribes a commercial bank as a multiple-product pr ice discriminating 
monopolist. 28 The exposition of this model i s conducted under con-
ditions of absolute certainty. The fo l lowing assumptions are made: 
(1) there are three types of assets (business loans, residential 
mor t gages , and government securities); (2) the marginal cost of pro-
clueing each of these assets is identical (marginal costs are i ndependent 
of the composition of the portfolio); (3) there are no required re-
serves and no borrowed reserves ; (4) there i s no risk of default on 
any of the three types of loans; (5) there are no fluctuations in 
deposit- liabilities creating unforeseen demands for reserves; (6) 
there are no transaction cos t s in the purchase of any of the assets; 
27Bernard Shull and Paul M. Horvitz, "Branch Banking and the 
Structure of Competi tion," The National Banking Review, 1 (1-farch 1964), 
303. 
28 Bernard Shul.l, "Corroncrcial Banks as Multiple-Product Price 
lliscrimina ting Firms," in Banking arid Monetary Studies, ed . Deane 
Carson (Homewood, Ill.: lhchard D. Jrwm, Inc., 1963), pp. 351-368 . 
(7) the bank will maximize the change in net worth within a specified 
time horizon; and (8) in lieu of risks, there exists barriers to 
entry and prevention of relending that enable the banking firm to be 
a price discriminator. 
The bank, beginning in a position with no earning assets i n its 
portfolio, will make the loan that brings in the greatest amount of 
revenue. If ordering the loans shows the marginal revenue associated 
with the first unit of business loans to be greater than the marginal 
revenue of the first units of resident i al nnrtgages or government 
securities, then the bank will enter the market for business loans 
first. TI1e bank will expand its business loans until the marginal 
revenue on business loans falls below the marginal revenue associated 
with the first units of residential mortgage loans. Assuming yields 
on some of the latter exceed the yield on government securities, the 
bank will then increase its holdings of both assets keeping their 
declining marginal revenues equal. This expansion of assets will con~ 
tinue as long as marginal costs are below marginal revenue. 
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Eventually, the marginal revenues associated with business loans 
and residential mortgages will decline to the level of the marginal 
revenue on government securities. 1ne demand for government securities 
from this commercial bank may be perfectly elastic. If this is the 
case, the marginal revenue will remain constant as the bank expands i ts 
purchases of these securities until the marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost. Once the bank begins the purchase of government secur-
ities, it will not m:;kc any more business loans or mortgap,e loans, 
24 
since this would involve mar ginal revenues lower than could be gained 
in the government securities market. 
Figure 1 graphically depicts Shull's model. If it is assumed that 
profit maximization (HRm. = ~1Rm1 = MRGS = ~1C) defines a stable equil-
ibrium for the banks portfolio, then the bank will hold Oa of its 
assets in business loans, ab in residential mortgages, and he in 
government securities. (All of its assets are earning assets.) The 
interest rates charged on all three types of loans are defined as their 
average revenues, iBL' iRW and iGS' respectively . The existence of 
downward sloping demand (i.e., monopoly power) is sufficient to cause 
a bank to diversify its portfolio. 
Shull 's model considers the commercial bank as a price discrimin-
ating monopolist, who restricts certain credit lines by charging higher 
' prices. A number of models have been proposed, which consider those 
banks with monopoly power to be non-price credit rationers. Jaffee 
and ~1odigl iani argue that, under certain circumstances, it may be 
rational for a bank to be a complete price discriminator, charging 
each customer a different price, but that in the banking system of the 
United States the necessary conditions are not met. 29 Tnstead, at the 
ceiling rate of interest the bank's demand for loans may be greater 
than the bank is willing to offer . The bank will have to ration credit 
among its cus tomers. 
In the presence of risk as to the outcome of the loan, reduc-
ing the si zc of the loan \vi ll increase the expected return, hy 
reducing the expected loss from insolvency of the fh111. It i s , 
290\vight Jaffee and Franco Modigliani, "A Theory and Test of 
Credit Rationing," American Economic Review, 59 (December 1969) , 850-871. 
rate 
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iRK 
MC 
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Figure 1. The multiple-product price discriminating bank. 
therefore, quite understandable that a bank faced with a 
higher opportunity cost (whether from a rise in the market 
rate or in lending opportunities) and unable to raise the 
return by raising rates, will find it profitable to raise its 
return at least by upgrading the quality of its portfolio 
through a reduction of risk; the upgrading may take the form 
of shifting funds toward less risky customgrs, and/or of 
reducing loans made to the same customer.3 
25 
This analysis depends crucially upon the concept of default risk and 
upward limitations (non-market) on rates of interest. In the absence of 
default risk it would be irrational for a banker to use non-price credit 
rationing. In the presence of default risk and interest rate limi-
tations the banker would not become a price discriminator of the 
30Ibid., p. 865. 
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first degree. 31 According to Jaffee and ~lod igl iani, it would be ir-
rational for the banker to attempt to capture all the consumer surplus. 
Instead, the banker will classify his customers into specific groups, 
charging the same price within the group, but different prices to dif-
ferent groups. fn the presence of default risk the banker will use 
methods of non-price rationing to limit credit within a group, while 
credit is still rationed with price differentials between groups. 
This is not first degree price discrimination as described by Pigou, 
but it is akin to the mult1ple-product price discrimination described 
by Eli Clemens, 32 on which Shull bases his model. Shull 's model is pro-
posed in a risk f ree world and would under those assumptions be consis-
tent with Jaffee and Modigliani's model with the introduction of risk. 
Fmpi rical evidence of 
bank1ng monopol1es 
Franklin Frlwards, proceeding from the idea of limited borrower 
alternatives for small business firms , attempts to test two hypotheses: 
(1) that, ceteris paribus, the level of business loan rates 
is higher 1n markets hav1ng relatively high concentration; 
and (2) that, ceteris paribus, business loan rates are less 
flexible in markets fiav1ng relativel y high concentration.33 
Using a sample of forty- nine Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMA) as 
consti tuting the appropriate markets and measuring concentration by 
311\ . C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed., (London: 
fvlacMillan, 1932), Chapter 17. 
32m i Clemens, "Price Discrimination and the ~~Jltiple-l'roduct 
irm," Review of Economic Studies 1.9(1950-Sl), 1-11. 
33Frankl in IL Edwards, "Concentration in Banking and Tts Fffect 
on Bus iness Loan Rates," Review of Economics and Statistics, 46 
(August 1964) , 294 . 
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the percentage of deposits held by the three largest banks in each 9-1A , 
Edwards draws the following inferences: 
concentration in banking markets should not be permitted to 
increase because of its adverse affect on price competition; 
... since high concentration is associated with rigid 
price behavior , a more concentrated banking structure would make 
more difficul t certain monetary policy objectives; and since 
increasing concentration would probably raise rates charged 
small borrowers, by more in relation to rates charged large 
borro~o1ers, the r esult might be discriminatory reallocation 
of funds from small to large borrowers.34 
In a study by George Kaufman based on observations of individual 
banks in the state of Iowa the structure of the banking industry is 
related to the "performance" of the banks. 35 Kaufman suggests five 
possible measures of bank "performance": (l) gross interest rate 
charged on loans and (2) interest rate paid on time and savings de -
posits (price measures); (3) the ratio of loans to total assets and 
(4) the ratio of time deposi t s to total deposits (activity measures); 
and (5) net current before tax earnings as a percentage of total 
assets. He r el ates these performance variables to three indicators 
of market structure and to five factors effecting market demand. 1he 
three structural variabl es are: (l) the ratio of total savings and 
loan associa tions assets to total commercial bank deposits; (7.) the 
dis tance from the nearest major financial center; and (3) either the 
number of banks or a concentration ratio. 1he five factors of demand 
that are incorporated into the analysis are: (l) population size; 
(2) population growth; (3) median family income; (4) growth of 
34 Jbid.' p. 300 . 
35
ccorgc C. Kat1fman, "R'lnk Market Struc ture and l'crfoTITlr'lnce: The 
Evi dence from Iowa ," Southern Economic Journal, 32 (August 1964), 42>J-
439 . 
28 
family income; and (5) ratio of nonagricultural employment to total 
employment. Based on regressions of the structural and demand variables 
on the performance variables, Kaufman concludes: 
The greater was the number of banks or the lower was the 
percentage of deposits held by the largest bank , the l ower 
were effective rates charged on loans, the higher were 
interest rates paid on time deposits and the greater was 
the ratio of time deposits to total deposits. In addition, 
the greater was bank concentration, the greater were pretax 
earnings on assets.36 
Shull's model has not, as yet, been subjected to a rigorous empiri-
cal test. He points out that casual observation of the behavioral 
characteristics of the banking industry is consistent with the theory, 
but this does not constitute a rigorous test. ~bwever, some attempts 
have been made to utilize this theory in estimating the monopoly of a 
commercia l bank. 37 Eric Brucker uses the analysis to calculate the 
el asticity of demand for loans. Assuming that the government securities 
market i s perfectly competitive (ARGS = ~1RG5), he uses the fac t that 
marginal revenues of all the assets will be the same to estimate the 
elas ticities of demand: 
36
rbid., p. 438. 
AR -AR IlL GS 
( 4) 
37Eric Brucker, "II Microeconomic Approach to Banking Competition," 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 25, (December, 1970), 1133-1141. 
Having estimated the elasticities on the basis of interest rate obser-
vations, Brucker compares the use of the loan-asset ratio and the 
29 
elasticity of demand as measures of monopoly power and he finds that the 
elasticity of demand measure is far superior. The general argument with 
regard to the loan-asset ratios is that those banks which hold a high 
percentage of their loan portfolio in a highly competitive loan class 
would be less competitive, since they are restricting their l oans in 
the noncompetitive class. Beth Kaufman and Fdwards use loan-asset 
ratios as an activity indicator of monopoly power. 38 In a doctoral 
dissertation Michael Klein tests a recursive model of choice in deter-
mining the loan-asset ratio. 39 His approach follows t he analysis of 
Shull and indicates that price differences between loans and other 
assets (government securities) may depend on the elasticit y of suppl y 
of the primary security to the bank. Although Klein's model is not 
derived directly from Shull's, his conclusions lend support to the con-
tention that monopoly power is an important determinant of a commercial 
bank's portfolio. 
Literature on the appropriate 
t1me hor1Zon 
lne three empirical studies cited do not consider the profit maxi-
mizing motives of the bank . Instead they look only at the conditions 
of demand. In order to consider the bank as a profit maximizer it is 
necessary to know over what period of time the banker bases his 
deci sions . The theoretical model of this paper outlines three distinct 
38 Franklin Edwards, "Concentration in Banking , " and George 
Kaufman, "Bank ~1arket Structure." 
3 9~1i chael A. Klein, "Differential Commercial Rank Portfolio 
Allocabon" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968). 
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planning horizons: (l) an annual period over ~Vhich the bank adjusts 
its portfolio to maximize profits; (2) an intermediate time period 
during which the bank is able to adjust some of its assets to conform 
to cl~nging market conditions; (3) and the short run period \Vhere the 
bank is subj ect to random variations beyond its own control. 
Problems arise ~Vi th the optimal time planning horizon for banking 
operations. The reaction time for different types of situations 
differs . For instance , a change in general market conditions may affect 
the demand for loanable funds from the bank, but several months may be 
required for the bank to adjust to this change in condition. On the 
other hand, fluctuations in deposits may necessitate immediate adjust-
ment of the asset portfolio or changes in r ates paid on government 
securitie s may initiate an immediate revision of the bank's portfolio. 
With these time differences it is natural to ask what the appropriate 
planning period for a bank is. Should the bank maximize the flow of 
profits at all times? Should the bank maximize the annual change in 
net worth, or should the time horizon be much longer? 
William Bryan and Willard Carleton in an analysis of the day to 
day f luctuations in a single bank conclude that their study 
supports the image of an individual commercial bank which at 
all times seeks to minimize its holdings of nonearning assets 
and IVhich makes adjustments to shifts in deposits and loan 
demand by changing its borrowing position. While excess 
reserve position appears to be responsive to changes i n the 
yield foregone in that asset nearest to cash, U.S . Treasury 
bills, it appears to be unrespansiv8 to shifts in loan de-
mands or to movements in deposits.4 
40William R. Bryan and Willard T. Carleton, "Short-Run Adjustments 
of an Individual Bank," Econometrica 35 (April 1967), 342. 
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Bryan and Carleton's study initiated further research on the actual mode 
of the adjustment process to deposit variability or changes in loan de-
mand. The studies are conflicting and inconclusive. 
Donald Hester and James Pierce argue that 
the ease of purchase and sale clearly differs among assets. 
Cash can be exchanged instantaneously at zero cost. Treasury 
bills can be purchased or sold quickly at low cost. 
Transaction fees for other U.S. government securities are 
higher than those for bills. Mortgages can be acquired 
quickly and in volume only if the banlc is willing to incur 
high promotional expense and/or make rate concessions. 
\Vhile the purchase of other loans involves the same sort 
of costs of rapid and extensive acquisitions as mortgages, 
there is no organized secondary market for these assets. 
If a bank were to receive an increase in the l evel 
of its deposits, even if it knew with certainty that the funds 
would not be withdrawn, it would not attempt to place them 
immediately in an illiquid form.41 
The bank will adjust slowly , buying first those assets with which lower 
transaction costs are associated (and also lower rates of return). 
Aft er some l onger period of time the bank will acquire high return 
assets complet ing the adjustment process. 
William Dewald and Richard Dreese argue in a similar fashion: 
Banks facing reserve deficits because of deposit withdrawals 
or excess accumulation of earning assets have several alterna-
tives open to them to meet their reserve requirements: earn-
ing assets can be sold; deposits can be at tracted; or funds 
can be borrowed from the Federal Reserve or others. lhe 
reserve adjustment instruments include assets with short 
maturities traded in well-established markets and hence with 
little risk of depreciation in the immediate run. 
Portfolio adjustments would be made until each al-
ternative adjustment offered equal marginal net yield . If a 
reserve loss is expected to be permanent, a bank would dis-
invest in that asset for which the marginal yield was expected 
to be the smallest. In the case of reserve losses that were 
expected to be reversed , however, a bank would consider the 
net cost of sell ing an asset and subsequently buying it back. 
41Donald D. Hester and James L. Pierce , "Cross -Section Analysis 
and Bank Dynamics," The Journal of Political Economy, 76 (July-
August 1968), 760, 762. 
Temporary reserve changes would lead banks to a different 
portfoli o position than reserve positions that were expected 
to be perrnanent.4 2 
Dewald and Dreese argue that specific assets may serve as vehicles for 
the adjustment process . Which assets serve as the vehicle depends on 
whether a change in deposits or loans demand is considered permanent 
or temporary . 
Donald Fraser and Peter Rose investigating the role of selected 
assets in the adjustment process fo r a sample of five individual banks 
come to conclus ions that concur with Hester and Pierce's analysi s . 43 
They find that short -run changes of excess reserves are not respons ive 
to changes in interest rates, but that given a random "shock" which 
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disturbs the banks actual holdings of excess reserves , the bank returns 
to its desired l eve l at most within a few weeks. With government 
securities, as well as with excess reserves, Fraser and Rose find that 
the securities are unresponsive to interest rate differentials , but that 
t hey do respond to deposit fluctuations. Their model incorporates a 
s tock adj ustment formula to explain a gradual adjustment to a new 
optimal level of the s tock of assets. 
In the theoretica l model presented in this paper it wil l be assumed 
that certa in assets operate as adjustment vehicles. The bani': will 
maximize t he expected flow of net revenues from these adjustment 
vehicles over the intermediat e time horizon. 44 Other assets do not 
42William G. Dewald and G. Richard Dreese, "Bank Behavior with 
Respect to Deposit Variability," Journal of Finance 25 (September 1970), 
870-871. 
43Donald R. Fra ser and Peter S. Rose, "Short-Run Bank Portfolio 
Behavior : An Examination of Selected Liquid Assets," Journal of 
Finance 28 (May 1973), 531-537. 
44
cf., Chapter ITT, p. 44. 
enter directly into the adjustment process. The net revenue of all 
assets is assumed to be maximized over a longer but finite period of 
time (i.e., a year). 
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CHAPTER III 
A 11-!EORETICAL MODEL OF A CCMMERCIAL BANK 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an overall framework for 
the operations of a commercial bank. It is within the context of this 
framework that monopoly power in commercial banking will be scrutinized. 
The theory presented here will not be tested. Its purpose is to 
elucidate the simplifying assumptions made in the empirical model which 
will be tested. For this reason an attempt will be made to make the 
theory relatively comprehensive. In previous investigations of monopoly 
power in commercial bankli1g, models have been developed and criticized 
for exhibiting peculiar aspects of the commercial bank while ignorlilg 
other aspects. Each simplifying assumption is a potential source of 
error . The theoretical model will provide a systematic check for the 
possible sources of error in the empirical model. 
The profit seeking firm 
The commercial bank is a business firm whose basic objective may 
be considered to be the accumulation of net revenues. 1he typical 
bank begins its business life by establishing a capital fund. 1his may 
come in the form of a single proprietorship, a closed corporation, or 
an open corporation. In these respects, the commercial bank does not 
diffe r from any other commercial venture. Once its physical facilities 
have been set up, its everyday operations resembly those of a department 
store. Jt acquires inputs of primary securities and cash and is pre-
pared to provide indirect debt for sale to its customers. 
35 
The basic function of the commercial bank is to act as a financial 
intermediary. As such , it purchases primary securities (in part by 
extendi ng loans) from "ultimate borrowers" and issues indirect debt 
(receives deposits) for the portfolios of the "ultimate lenders." The 
bank participates in two dist inct markets: a market for primary 
securities and a market for indirect debt . 
The product of intermediation is the indirect financial 
asset coined from the underlying primary security and 
bearing its own bundle of ut i lities. The reward for 
intermediation arises f rom the difference between the 
rate of return on primary securities and the interest 
or dividend rate they pay on their indirect debt.45 
The assets and liabilities of the financial intermediary ar e 
highly specialized . As a department store would, the commercial hank 
treats its customers at utility maximizers and provides a number of 
alternatives designed t o meet the needs and desires of specific groups 
of "ul t imate borrowers" and "ultimate lenders" respectivel y. It is 
here that a commer c i al bank differs f rom any other business venture , 
either commercial or financial. One of the liabilities devised to 
meet the needs of "ultimate lender s" i s de111and deposits . Thi s makes 
them unique among business ventures. As an institution commercial 
banks create demand deposits, i.e., money. Commercial hanks are the 
onl y business fj rms that arc 1 cgally penni tted to issue i ncli rcct debt 
in the form of demand depos its . '/he 1 Cf~al framework that surround s 
the commercial banki nr. system has been developed because of the peculiar 
nature of the liability, demand deposits, as money. 
45 John G. Gurley and Edward Shaw, Money and the Theogt of Finance 
(Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institut1on, 1960), p. 1 3. 
If the commercial bank chooses the maximization of annual nrofits 
as a goal, then the bank will maximize the difference between revenues 
uerived from the purchase of primary securities and the cost incurred 
in the sale of indirect debt, ignoring administrative and operating 
cost for the time being. If these revenues and costs are expressed 
in tems of rates of interest, then the commercial hank Hill maximize: 
p A i L r , (5) 
where Pis profits, A is the total amount of primary securities 
(assets) , L is the total amount of indirect debt (liabilities), 
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i s the rate of interest paid to the bank on the primary securities,46 
and r is the rate of interest paid by the bank on indirect debt. 
Since commercial banks, Hithin the institutional structure and 
under governmental regulation, develop different types of indirect 
debt and pr imary securities for their customers, one Hould expect 
different prices to be associated with each fom of debt and security . 
The profit equation could he expressed as : 
n m 
p l: A. i. l: Lk rk (6) j=l J J k=l 
where there are n types of assets and m foms of liabilities. 
46As cxpresseJ , these interest rates arc average rates, which 
ucpend on the maturity composition of the portfolio, :md arc weir(htccl 
averages of the amount of primary securities purchased at na st time 
period sti ll in the portfolio and the prevailing rates of interest at 
the time. [f the assets increase, adding more newer assets to the 
port folio , the weight of the current interest rate will increase . 
Special empirical treatment will be given t o this problem, see 
Chapter IV, p. 68 . 
Commerci al bank: monopolist 
and monopson1st 
The legal framework within which a commercial bank operates en-
con~asses four basic areas : (1) restrictions on bank entry; (2) 
branching barriers ; (3) limitations on earning assets; and (4) 
i nter es t payment limitations. The last two areas are direct restric-
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tions on a bank's asset portfolio and liability holdings. These insti-
tutional restrictions (reserve requirements, regulation Q, capitalization 
restrictions, et c .) will not be dealt with at this point. 47 
'!he first two areas may directly affect the intensity of competition 
in the banking industry. Commercial ·banks have to obtain a charter from 
either the Comptroller of the Currency or a state banking agency. These 
agencies in the past have been concerned with the problem of "over-
banking" within geographical areas and therefore tended to restrict the 
number of charter s issued. Restrictions on branch banking in thirty-
four of the fifty states similarly tends to diminish the degree of compe-
tition. 1he existence of monopoly power or monopsony power is character-
i zed by a downward sloping demand curve for the firms product and an 
upward sloping supply curve for the firms inputs. With a do"mward slop-
ing demand curve the monopolist banker is no longer a price-taker, he is 
able to control the quantity of his product de~,nded by either raising 
or lowering the price. On the other hand the monopsonist in the input 
market can affect the quantity of the input supplied to him changing the 
price for the input. Since people voluntarily deposit funds in a bank, 
47These aspects will be incorporated into the empirical model in 
Chapter IV. 
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the bank may change its cus tomers decisions by altering the rate of 
interest paid on deposits . The same applies for changes in loans: the 
bank extends a greater amount of loans by lowering the rate of interest 
charged . 48 
Let Aj denote the demand function for the jth 
A. 
J 
49 type of loan: 
(7) 
48Note that this concept is open to debate. In David A. Alhadeff 
and Charlotte P. Alhadeff , "An Integrated Model fo r Commercial Banks" 
1l1e Journal of Finance, 12 (March 1957) , 26. Alhadeff writes, "In deter-
mining portfol1o composition bankers generally avoid rate competition. 
At any moment of time, therefore, bankers accept the going rate for 
different kinds of credit and adjust their portfolios to the existing 
rate schedule." However, Eric Brucker in "A Micro-economic Approach to 
flanking Competition , " Journal of Finance, 25 (December 1970), 1140, con-
c ludes that commercial banks do eXh1b1t the t endencies of price fixers. 
"By viewing the bank as a multiple-product price-discriminating fi rm, a 
measure of bank output performance was deve loped which has shown to 
have a closer relationship to the theoretical concept of monopoly power 
than the often used operating ratios. 111e empirical evidence 
generated by the applicat ion of thi s model ... suggests that the elas-
ticity measure may prove to be a meaningful indicator of the bank's 
relative competitive position . " For a more detailed discussion see 
Chapter II I. 
49Following common usage , the demand for credit extended by the 
bank i s referred t o as the "demand for loans." Strictly speaking (see 
above) , it is funds which are demanded, and loans (as primary securities) 
are supplied to and held by the bank as assets. The same consider-
ations apply to "depos its, " which are referred to here as being 
"supplied" to the bank. 
501he following notat ion 1vill be used throughout the paper. 
l'unct iorwl relationships are c.lcnotcd by superscripts . Number values 
a rc denotec.l by the subscripts. Where there is no question of ambiguity, 
the argwnents of the functional r elationships wi l l be omitted. 
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and let Lk denote the supply function for the kth type of deposit: 
(8) 
Expressed in this form both the loan market and the deposit market may 
or may not be per fectly competitive. Note, also, that one of the A.'s J 
may be cash or reserves t o which is attached an i.=O and that one of 
J 
the Lk's nmy be demand deposits to which is attached rk=O . 
If the market s are monopol is tic or monopsonistic then the bank con-
trols the rate of inter es t and thereby indirectly affects the volUJlle of 
deposits and loans. 51 Equation (7) and (8) may be subst i tuted into 
equation (6) to give a profit function: 
I' 
n 
i: 
j=l 
(9 ) 
For purposes of exposition def ine the following inverse functions: 
ij (A.) 
J 
k k-l 
r (~) = 1 
For the functions and 
(10) 
k 
r ' def ined in equati on (10), in the ma r -
kets where there is no monopsony or monopoly power the first partial s 
wi th respect to the J\j ' s ~nd Lk ' s will be zero. .If these functions 
51 Dwight Jaffee and Franco Modligiani argue that monopol y powe r wi ll 
cause intermediaries to ration credit rather than raise interes t rates . 
"A Theory and Test o.f Credit J<ationing," American Economic Review , 59 
(December 1969) , 850 -871. However, this v1e1v 1s rnd1hed m terms of 
the t ime cons traints . "In the long run , a rational banker would select 
the rate which maxi mizes his expected profits; but other cons traints 
may preclude immediate full adjustment in the short run" p . 855 . 
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were left in their original fom the first partial with respect to rates 
of interest would be infinite for perfectly competitive markets. The 
profit function may now be re1-rri tten as: 
p 
n 
); 
j=l 
ij (A.)A. 
J J 
(11) 
The hank which chooses to maximize profits will maximize equation 
(11) subject to the constraint that assets are equal to liabilities plus 
net worth (where one of the A.'s 
J 
is cash). The bank will maximize the 
Lagrangian express ion: 
n m n 
;;t_ (P) = l: 
j=l 
l: r Lk - 6( 
k=l j=l 
A. 
J 
m 
l: ~ - N) 
k=l 
where B is a Lagrangian multiplier and N is the capital account. 
Cost of loans and deposits 
(12) 
It is argued that the Jrost important costs may not be the interest 
costs . 52 Associated with each type of asset and each type of liability 
there are managerial costs. These are research costs for loans, adver-
tising costs for deposits, computer costs, accounting costs, secretarial 
costs, and the like. Different types of assets and liabilities have 
different cos t s associated with them. These costs may be given a 
functiona l expression: 
52Goo rge J. Benston, "A Microeconomic Approach to Ranking Compe-
tition: Comment," Journal of Finance, 27 (June 1972, 722-723. 
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c. cj (A.) cj (Aj (i.)) j=l, .. . ,n (13) 
J J J 
ck Ck(~) Ck(Lk(rk)) k=l, . . . ,m 
where Cj is the total cost of administering Aj units of the jth 
type of asset and Ck i s the t otal cost of administering ~ units of 
the kth type of liability . These cost functions may contain fixed, 
as well as variable, cos ts. The Lagrangian expression for constrained 
profits i s now: 
n 
ij m k n 
.;t_ (P) = l: A. l: r Lk l: j =l J k=l j=l 
n m 
- s ( l: A. l: j =l J k=l 
The first order Eul er maximization conditions 
a;((P) i j ~ 
J 
a;((P) 
--ar; -r 
~(P) - ~ 
---as- j=l 
k 
aij 
+ A. ap:::- J J 
a/ 
- a~ 
A. 
J 
~ 
m 
l: 
k=l 
-
a cj 
- s 
a Aj 
ack 
s aik -
- N 0 
cj m ck 
- l: (14) 
k=l 
~ - N) 
are: 
0 j=l , ... ,n (lSa) 
0 , k=l, ... ,m (l Sb) 
(1 Sc) 
Jn this case S is e4ual to the rnarginal revenue associated with the 
jth type of asset or the rm.rginal cost associated with the kth type 
of liability. 
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Deposit-liability fluctuations 
Thus far , the model has been developed wi thin the confines of 
absolute certainty and a riskless world. It is completely deterministic. 
Once the supply and demand functions are known, the banker merely adjusts 
the interest rates (and thus his portfolio) until hi s pr ofits are maxi-
mized. However, the connnercial banks supply of deposits and demand for 
loans are not absolutely cert ain. Associated with both deposits and 
l oans is a degree of variability over time. It will be assumed that this 
variability i s random . Jf t here is an unexpect ed increase in deposi t s, 
adjustment will have to be made in the asset portfolio as cash is 
accunrul ated. If there i s an unexpected decline in deposits , adjus t ments 
will have to be made in the asset portfolio as cash is depl et ed . 
At this point it is useful to distinguish between two cl asses of 
assets: (1) assets that ar e relatively liquid, which are used to 
handle short-term fluctuations; (2) assets that are r el a tively illiquid, 
which are not sold t o cope with short-term fluctuations . The first type 
of asset includes those such as case, U.S. Treasury Securities, 
Securities for Federal Agencies, and other similar assets with lmv de-
fault ri sk. Markets for this type of security may be assumed to be pe r -
fect l y competitive , i .e ., the demand for loans through these securities 
i s not a function of the rate of interest paid by the bank. "!he bank 
controls the volume of these assets: 
A. 
J 
j =l, ... ,h (l6a) 
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1;here there are h types of assets in this class. The demand for the 
second class of assets i s a function of the rate of interest and this 
demand is subject to random variation: 
+ njk j;h+l, .. . , n (16b) 
where is the random variation associated with the demand for the 
j th type of asset. It is assumed that E (Tlj) ; 0 or that E(Aj) 
Aj (ij). These assets are not liquidated to handle deposit fluctuations. 
Supplies of liabilities are functions of the rate of interest and 
are subject t o random variation: 
k;l, ... ,m (16c) 
where £k is the random variation associated with the kth liability 
and by assumption C( Ek) ; 0 or R(Lk) 
Equations (16a) may be written as (17a) and (16b) and (16c) and after 
taking expectations may be solved for their inverses in terms of the 
interest rates (17b) and (17c) . 
i. . o j;l' ... ,h (17a) 1. 
J J 
i. ij (E(Aj)) Aj-l(i.), j;h+l, ... ,n (l7b) J J 
k k-1 k;l, . .. ,m (17c) rk r (E( ~)) L (rk), 
Note that the arguments of the interest rate functions are expected 
values of the volume of assets and liabilities, not the actual volumes. 
"fhe accounting identity that assets are equal to liabilities plus 
net worth can now be written as: 
n 
l: A. 
j=l J 
h 
l: A . + 
j=l J 
h 
l: A. + 
j=l J 
h 
l: A. + 
j=l J 
n 
l: 
j=h+l 
n 
l: 
j=h+l 
n 
l: 
j=h+l 
Aj 
Aj 
m 
l: 
k=l 
m 
l: 
k=l 
Lk 
N = 0 
n 
l: 
k=l 
Lk 
- N 
N 
m 
l: 
k=l 
y 
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(18) 
n = 0 
n 
Ek l: nj j=h+l 
where y i s a random variable which is a convolusion of the nj ' s and 
ck's, and has a density function f(y), which is likewise a convolution 
of the density function of and It will he assumed that n. 's 
J 
E(y) = 0 and that f(y) is symetric in its domain from minus infinity 
to pos itive infinit y . 53 
It is convenient to visualize the bank as operating under three 
dis tinct time horizons. First , there is the very short run. This is 
the day to day, hour to hour period where changes in the asset portfolio 
are not planned, but are merely induced. If there is a random fall in 
the level of deposits, the depositors are paid with cash, thus there is 
~n induced change in the cash account of the asset rort.fol.io. 
53 . k Si nce the A.'s, AJ's, L ' s, and N are stocks that arc held or 
planned to be heldJLy the bank over a given planning horizon, the 
random variation may be considered flows in or out of the s t ocks of 
assets or liabilit i es. 
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Second, there is a slightly longer horizon during which the bank 
may alter its holdings of liquid assets. As the cash account is de-
pleted, due to a random rise in the loan account or a random fall in de-
posits, the net marginal return from the cash account may rise above the 
net marginal return for other assets. During the second time horizon, 
which may be a week or a reserve week, the bank may sell some of its 
liquid assets in such a way that the net marginal return for each of the 
liquid assets is equated. 1nird, there is a long horizon of time (i.e., 
a year) over which the expected profits of the bank are maximized . This 
is the planning horizon for the bank on which all of its portfolio 
decisions are made . 
Whenever the random variable y is positive, cash is depleted in 
the first time period by an amount y . For the second time horizon the 
bank may consider changing its liquid asset holdings (including cash) 
by an amount y, in order to equalize the net marginal return for all 
the liquid assets. It is possible that the net marginal return for cash 
is unchanged, in which case the entire random variation would be absorbed 
in the cash account. 
Starting with the random variation (y) equal t o zero, expected 
profits would be maximized with: 
a f'(P) 
ai\j B , j =·l, .. . ,h (19) 
As random variation occurs in the first time horizon, the net l!larp.inal 
return to cash may change. In the second time horizon the bank will 
act so as to equate the net marginal returns for the liquid assets: 
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a E(P) 
~ 
a E(P) 
aAZ 
a E(P) 
~ (20) 
Note that these partials are no longer necessarily equal to 6 since 
equality is a condition for profit maximization over the third tiwe 
horizon. 
Since y is the difference between the optimal amount of assets 
and the actual amount assets in the portfolio at a point in time. 
y A* = A\ + A* 2 + (21) 
where Aj i s the amount of the j th asset removed from the portfolio. 
If all the random variation happens to be absorbed in the cash account: 
y 
A* 
J 
A* 
0, 
A* l 
j=2, ... ,h 
In this case the bank makes no change between the firs t time horizon and 
second time horizon. It just accepts the induced cash depletion from the 
firs t time horizon. However, if the net marginal return to cash rises , 
some of the other assets will not be in the portfolio during the second 
time period. They will be removed in such a way as to satisfy equation 
(16) . lherefore, for small A* and ignoring the cross effects, the Aj 
may be expressed according to: 54 
54Take the differential such that equation (30) is cont.inuously 
satisfied . 
A* 
J 
A* 
J 
= A* /c ~ j 's=l 
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(22) 
The difference between the optimal amount of the jth asset and the 
actual amount in the portfolio in the second time horizon is a portion of 
total change in assets in the first time horizon. The portion i s a 
function of the second partial s of the expected profits function with 
respect to the liquid assets (first h assets). 
TI1is portion of assets differing from the optimal may be expressed 
in functional form as: 
(23) 
The interest payments lost when asset s are not in the portfolio is the 
sum of the products of the rates of interest and the probability that 
Aj of the jth type of asset will not be in the portfolio. This 
* probabi lity may be interpreted as the percent of the time that Aj 
not in the portfolio. 
'lhe expected value of Aj of the jth asset will be: 
and the expected interest loss where y>O is: 
is 
(2 4) 
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h 
E i. pj ! y f (y) dy 
j=l J 0 
This expression allows A~ 
J 
to be greater than Aj, so that a non-
negativity restriction must be placed on the Aj. One way to construct 
such a restriction is to order the first h assets in ascending order 
of the values for their second partials and write the expected interest 
loss as: 
l. 
J 
This expression may be interpreted as the interest rate times the per-
cent of the tin~ that some of the jth asset is not in the portfol io . 
The formulation assumes that the probability that y is greater than 
A. 
J 
is zero . However, it also prevents Aj from becoming negative. 
There is the possibility of an interest gain when y is negative. 
y less than zero implies that deposits have randomly increased or loans 
have randomly decreased and that during the first time period cash has 
been accumulated . The extra cash may cause the net marginal return to 
cash to be helm; the net marginal return to other assets. Therefore, 
during the second time horizon some of t he cash is exchanged for other 
asset s , and an increased amount of other assets is held for the second 
time horizon. The conditions for the exchange of assets is the same as 
above. IJuring the second time horizon liquid assets ar e held in such 
proportions that net marginal returns to the first h assets is equal. 
The expected interest gain in this case is: 
h 
l: 
j=l 
i. 
J 
0 J -ooyf(y) dy 
The expected interest gain is not symmetrical with the expected 
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interest loss. For the expected interest loss there is a maximum amount 
of each of the assets that may not be in the portfolio (e.g., the 
non-negativity restriction on the A.'s). In addition, at or near 
J 
optimally the pj will be the same increased amounts of Aj and for 
decreased amounts. However, for larger IYI the pj may become dif-
ferent, and the expected interest loss-gain function will not be 
symmetrical. 
However, since it has already been assumed that the n. 's and 
J 
Ek's have means zero and symmetrical density functions, the convolusions 
of these random variables will also have mean zero and a symmetrical 
density function. 55 Since the non-negativity restriction assumes that 
the probability that y is greater than the sum of the assets is zero, 
this implies that the negative y cannot be less than the negative 
value of the sum of the asset. In addition, the pj ' s are not evalu-
ated for different values of y, instead, they are evaluated only at 
the optimal solution. Which together implies that the interest gain is 
symmetrical with and offsets the interest loss and these terms 1vill drop 
out of the expected profits function. 
1he bank now maximizes expected profits. lhe constrained 
Lagrangian of the expected profits function is: 
55f!oward G. Tucker, An lntroduction to Probabilit~ and ~lathematical 
Statistics (New Yo rk: Academ1c Press, 1962), pp. 33, 1. 
.;((E(P)) 
h 
E i.A. + j;l J J 
n 
cj E j ;1 
h 
- 8 ( E 
j;l 
A. + 
J 
n 
kjAj E j;h+l 
m 
E 
k;l 
n 
E j;h+l 
ck 
A. 
J 
m l~ E k;l 
N) 
where Aj and ~are mean values as determined by ij and rk. 
Transaction costs 
(25) 
Equation (25) assumes that the sale of assets is costless. In 
fact, the sale of an asset may involve numerous costs: "transaction 
costs, time cost with the bank plus the money charged by the dealer, 
and forfeiture costs, and cost associated with interest rate 
changes ."56 •57 Transaction costs will be incurred on A* units on the 
J 
so 
jth type of asset whenever Aj is bought or sold. The probability that 
the asset is in the portfolio times the probability that the asset will 
be removed from the portfolio. This i s so, since one event must follow 
the other in order for a transaction to be made . This may be expressed 
as a joint probability distribution. 
Let A* be the change in total assets that may take place at any 
point in time. Let Aj be the optimal amount of the jth type of 
asset 
56Kenneth Lyon, "Theory of Cormnercjal !lank Portfoho sc·lcction: 
·nw SimpU fiecl Model," unpublished paper, p. 4. 
57
costs associated with the interest rate changes refers t o the 
concept of market risk, which is treated in a separate section. 
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is the amount of the jth asset that will be in the portfolio at any 
point in time 
!;* f(y) dy ~: f(y) dy 
is the joint probability distribution function that A* assets will be 
bought or sold. Let tj be the cost of transaction $1 worth of the 
jth type of asset. The expected transaction cost will be the sum of 
the probability that each dollars worth of asset 1Vill be transacted 
times the transaction cost for that portion (pj) of the jth asset 
that will be transacted 
h 1\ pjA* A* 00 E(Tc) E t. ~ !_00 yf(y)dy J yf(y)dy (26) j=l J z=-A. A* 
J 
where 
'\ i s the sum of the optimal values of the first h assets 
h 
Ah ~ A 
q=l q 
For the continuous case: 
E(Tc) }dA* (27) 
The total expected tran saction cost is the i ntegral of the probability 
distribution function evaluated over the entire range of each of the 
jth assets times the cos t of transacting the jth type of asset. 
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Market risk 
Part of the transaction costs are "cost associated with interest 
rate changes ." Interest rates for the first h assets are not con-
trolled by the bank, they are determined by the banking industry, 
financial markets , and monetary authorities. If the interest rate on 
the jth security should increase then the price of the jth security 
falls . If it is assumed that interest rate variations for the nation 
as a whole are random, the price changes of the primary securities will 
also be random and the transaction cost can be expressed as a function 
of random variation. Let Aj represent the random variation of the 
price of the jth type of asset, with gj as its density function. 
Also let be the transaction cost at the time the j th asse t is 
acquired. Then the transaction cost per dollar of the jth type of 
security is a function of the random variable A .• 
J 
(28) 
The expression for transaction cost in equation (24) can be substituted 
into the expected transaction cost function. It should be noted that 
the first h securities tend to be short term in nature and, therefore, 
not subject to wide price swings. 
Default risk 
Another form of uncertainty that exists for the bank is default 
risk. Associated with every type or primary security there is a 
probabi 1 j ty that the loan will be in de rault. Let 6 j be the random 
percentage of the j th asset that will be in default: 6 . will have a 
J 
domain of 0 to 100 percent. Let uj(o.) be the density function of 
J 
the random percentage 
100% 
J o. uj(o.) do. 
0 J J J 
is the expected value of the percentage of the jth asset that will be 
in default, the probabi lity that Aj of the jth primary securities will 
default . The expected default loss is: 
E(DL) 
n 100% 
L: A. J oJ. uj ( o. ) do. j=l J 0 J J (29) 
Maximization of expected profits 
Transaction cos t s , market r isk, and default risk may all be 
incorporated into single expected profits function , which the banker 
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may choose t o maximize with respect to the volume of each of his assets 
and liabilities 
(E(P)) 
and the rates of inter est charged and paid: 
h n 
kjA. m k L: i.A. + L: L: r Lk j=l J J j=h+l J k=l 
n 
cj m ck L: L: 
j=l k=l 
n . Ah . A* 
- L: tJ(A.) J pJA* {! yf(y)dy J yf(y)dy} dA* (30) 
j=l J --\ A* 
n 
B ( L: A. j=l J 
N) 
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If the banker chooses t o maximize profits he will use the Eul er first 
order conditions to determine his portfol io deci sions. ~~imizing 
with respect to the volume of the first h assets, and the expected 
values of the other assets and liabili t ies (note that this implies that 
the banker control s the interest rates and not the actual volume of 
these financia l instruments) : 
a E(P) 
a A. 
J 
a E(P) 
TETfiJ 
a E(P) 
a s 
0, j=l, ... ,h 
0 , j=h+l, ... ,n 
0 , k=l, .. . ,m 
0 
(31) 
Whether or not the banker has some degree of monopoly pov1er he wi ll 
allocat e his portfolio of asset s and issues of liabilities in accord-
ance with the Eule r maximi zation conditions . The partials of the ex-
pected profi t s function will contain partials of the loan demand and 
deposit supply function. If these partials can be estimated on the 
:msis of the bankers behnvior , then the Lerner index of monopoly power 
can be used to measure the degree of monopoly prevalent i.n varjous 
banking markets. "The empirical mode l presented in the next chapter 
provides a method of estimating the partial of loan demand and deposit 
supply with respect to volume of assets he ld and liabilities issued. 
ss 
CHAPTER IV 
TilE B>IPIRICAL MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a testable hypothesis 
which will indicate whether a monopsony-monopoly model is of interest in 
the s tudy of commercial banking behavior. The theoretical concepts 
introduced in Chapter Ill are the foundations for the model proposed 
here. ·n1e chapter is divided into two parts: (1) the development of an 
empirical model; and (2) a discussion of the data. 
'Jhe <.levelopment of the empirical model 
The constrained expected profits function is expressed in the 
following fom: 
3 5 
ijA. 
5 
(E(P)) l: i.A . + l: + Rl l: A. j=2 J J j=4 J j =1 J 
2 2 3 
- r L2 c ( l: Lk + N) - l: E(TrCj) (32) k=l j=l 
s s 
- (l ( 1: A. + R2 ( L: Aj) - [,l - Lz - N) j=l J j= I 
'l11e first tenn is the interest earne<.l on liqu.id assets: A1 is cash 
on 1;hich no i nterest is earned; A2 is U.S. Treasury Securities; and 
A3 is securities of other Federal Agencies. 'The second tem is the 
interest earned on the less liquid assets over which the bank may have 
some monopoly power; A4 is state and local securities; A5 is loans. 
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111e third tem is non- interest revenue earned by the bank. This revenue 
is assumed to be a constant proportion (R1) of the sum of the first five 
classes of assets; it includes income f r om trust departments, service 
charges, and other related activities. The fourth term is the interest 
paid on time deposits (L2). L1 is demand depo sits on which no interest 
is paid. The fifth tem considers the administrative costs to be a 
fixed proportion (C) of the volume of total liabilities plus capital 
account. The sixth tem is the expected transaction costs, which are a 
function of the f irst three assets, serving as short-run adjustment 
veh iclcs, and the total random variability of deposits and loan demand. 
TI1e seventh t em is the accounting identity that assets equal liabilities 
plus net worth times the Lagrangian multiplier. In the seventh term the 
subtems are : (1) the first five assets; (2) other assets as a pro-
portion (R2) of the first five assets; (3) L1 is the expected level of 
demand deposits; (4) L2 is time deposits; and (5) N is net worth. 
Some of t hese terms need further explanation. 
Administra tive cost, as expressed i n the fifth term, implies several 
assumptions : (l) costs for the management of different types of assets 
and different types of liabilities do not differ (or that costs do not 
depend on the asset and liability mix); (2) all administrative costs 
are variable; and (3) there are no economies of scale. As mentioned 
above , the first assumpti on is open to considerable debate and may be a 
possible source of error. 58 The second assumption is Jess questionable, 
since fixed assets on the average amount to only 1.5 percent of total 
58 cr. Chapter li , p . 19 and Chapter I II , p. 4 2. 
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assets and net occupancy expenses amount only to 2.3 percent of total 
operating expense. 59 Though there may be other fixed costs, these should 
be relatively small. The third assumption implies that a bank is a 
constant cost firm. Table 1 shows the noninterest expense as a percen-
tage of total operating expense for different size banks. Due to the lack 
of individual bank data, it is not possible to establish a test of the 
significance of the difference between these averages. However, under 
casual observation there appears to be some problem with the smaller 
banks, but the larger banks appear to exhibit constant costs . In any 
event, the total range of variability is less than 4 percent of the total 
operating revenue and this approximates constant costs. 
As stated in the expected transaction cost in the expected profits 
function is a func tion of the first three asset classes (cash, U.S. 
Treasury Securities, and securities of other federal agencies) and the 
random variation of deposits and loan demand. Many different approaches 
to measure the random variation have been suggested . Dewald and Dreese 
utilize two different measures of deposit variability. 6° First, a co-
efficient of variation of the daily average of deposits is used : 
j l/N-1 
SD 
N 
l: 
t-1 (33) 
5\ederal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Oterating Statistics, 
1970 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Deposit Insuranceorporat10n, 1971). 
60
uewald and Dreese, "Bank and Behavior and Dcposit Variability," 
p. 874 0 
Table 1. Non-interest costs and bank scalea 
Banks with total deposits (in millions) 
Non-interest 
expense as a 
of total oper-
ating revenue 
As a % of total 
assets 
Number of 
banks 
All 
banks 
44.0 
2.63 
13342 
Under 
5 
47.1 
*b 
4228 
aRHC , Bank Operating Statistics. 
bComparable data not available for 
5-10 10-25 25-100 over 100 
43.0 42.2 42.6 43.3 
* * * * 
3436 3382 1745 551 
different size banks. 
58 
Second , they use a coefficient of variation of an estimate of deposits: 
DV (34) 
where \ is total deposits m the tth day, X is average total deposits, 
and Xt are the estimated total deposits (based on seasonality and trend 
in deposits). The 22 represents the degrees of freedom lost in es ti-
mating deposits. Dewald and Dreese find that the second measure is 
superior in its ability to interpret bank behavior. 61 flowever, both 
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measures require day to day observation of a sample bank. Compatable 
data for this study does not include day to day fluctuations. There-
fore, this problem will be avoided by considering expected transaction 
costs to be a scalar at the optimal (profit maximizing) allocation of 
the portfolio. 
The last term in the expected profits function constrains assets 
to be equal to liabilities plus net worth. The first five assets are 
assumed to be control variables. lhe first three asset classes are con-
trolled directly by the bank. The fourth and fifth assets (state and 
local securities and loans) are controlled by the bank indirectly through 
the rates of interest charged on these assets. (Note that the demand 
equation fo r either of these assets can be specified for a competitive or 
an imperfectly competitive market. State and local securities are in-
eluded in this group of assets because the literature indicates that they 
do not serve as part of the adjustment mechanism for short-term deposit-
liability fluctuations .) 62 The sixth type of asset includes all those 
assets elsewhere excluded (fixed assets , trading account securities , 
other securities, and other assets). Some of these assets service the 
first five types of assets and others are completely independent . It 
.is assumed that all are proportional to the volume of first five assets. 
The bank which maximizes its expected profits will do so with 
respect to i\j ' j=l, .... ,3 (cash , li.S. Treasury Securities, and securities 
of other federal agencies) ; E(A1), j=4,5 (the interest charged on state 
and local securities and on loans); E(L2) (the interest paid on time 
deposits) ; and 8 (the Lagrangian multiplier). The mean level of demand 
62
cf . Chapter II, p. 32. 
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deposits is an exogenous variable as far as the bank is concerned, since 
they are unable to pay interest on these deposits. Differences in 
services and service charges will be ignored . The level of the capital 
account for a particular planning hori zon is taken as a given value, 
not as a control variable. 
This calls for some comment, since Federal law, as well as state 
laws , requi re a minimum amount cf capital for the organization of a new 
bank or the establishment of branch offices. In addition, in recent 
years supervisory authorities have often required new operations to start 
with more than the legal minimum. The sLvervisory authority for the 
Federal Reserve member banks comes from Regulation H of the &lard of 
Governors and Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act, which provides that 
banks shall hold an "adequate" amount of capital . The &lard of Governors 
and various state agencies have established "rules of thumb" concerning 
the adequacy of capital financing. 63 In taking the level of capital 
account as a given value, the assumption i s made that the "rule of thumb" 
constraint is not operative within the planning horizon. Since enforce-
ment of the "rule" is by moral suasion and is not uniform, one is justi-
fied in assuming that within the portfolio planning horizon capital 
accounts are not a control variable. Hm;ever, over the longer planning 
horizon the bank may be undercapitalized (or even overcapitalized). In 
either case the profit maximizing bank would adjust the size of its 
capital account. 
63u. Chambers anc.J A. Charnes jn "Inter-Temporal An::tlys.is and 
Optimization of Hank Portfolios," build a "leverage rcquirCI'lent" into 
their fllJdel of a hanks portfolio. Thi s requirement i s a capital con-
straint based on the &lard of Governors "rule of thumb . " 
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Another account similar to the capital account is the loan reserve 
account. These are reserves for bad debts, which are established from 
pretax income in accordance with a fonnula pennitted by the Internal 
Revenue Service. 64 Each year the bank is allowed to take out of the 
pretax income a certain amount based on a twenty-year moving average 
of bad debts for that bank, which is placed in the loan reserve account. 65 
The loan reserve account is not permitted to exceed three times the 
twenty year moving average of bad debts. For the current year the loan 
reserve account cannot be altered , but only in future years in those 
cases where the maximum has not been reached. The account may be used 
in the same manner as the capital accOLmt to ins till confidence in de-
positors and to make additional purchases of primary securities . There-
fore, the loan reserve account is included in the variable N as part of 
the capital account. 
The bank which maximizes its expected profits will allocate its 
portfolio in accordance with the Euler first order nuximization con-
ditions: 
d.c(tE (P)) 
Rl 3E(TrC)/aA1 B SR2 0 aA1 
qL'(E(P)) 
i2 + Rl 3E(TrC)/3A2 - B - SR2 () (:>S) aA2 
64 Internal Revenue Service , Internal Revenue Bulletin : Cumulative 
Bulletin, 1954 - 1 (Washington , D.C.: U.S. Government Pnntlng Ofhce, 
1954), Regulation 118, Section 39.23(k)-r, pp. 60-62 . 
65The permitted addition could be taken as a proxy for F(o) in the 
measure of default risk. See Chapter II, p. 25 and Chapter III, p. 47. 
oi(E(P)) 
i3 + 1\ oE(TrC)/oA3 s - SR2 ;Q oA3 
q;{(E(P)) .4 4/ 1\ s - SR2 0 aA4 l + h oA4 ·A4 
+ 
1i(E(P)) .5 
ai 5 ;aA5 ·A5 + 1\ s - SR2 0 aA5 1 
+ 
'l;6E (P)) 2 2 c s 0 
oL2 
r or /oL2·Lz 
UlE(P)) 5 (1 + R2) E A. Ll L2 N ; 0 as j;l 
Note that L1 is not a control variable and the expected profits 
functions is not maximized with respect to demand deposits. 
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(35) 
Table expresses the Euler conditions as a system of simultaneous 
equations. Table 3 performs two substitutions and reduces the system to 
five equations . Table 4 solves the system of five equations in terms of 
the rates of interest which will be treated as endogenous variables. 
The exogenous variables will be the asset portfolio and the liabilities. 
1ne assignment of exogenous and endogenous variables is not intended to 
imply causation. Any monopolist has the choice of choosing to control 
either quantity or price, but he cannot control both. The assets and 
liabilities may be chosen as endogenous, or the rates of interest, but 
not hoth. 
Table 4 expresses the structural form of the model that wi 11 he 
tested . ·n,e interest rates are the endogenous variables and the assets 
Table 2. Euler first order Ill'Lximization conditions as a system of seven simultaneous equations 
3E(TrC)/aA1 + Rl - 8 (l+R2) 
aE(TrC)/aA2 + ~ - 8 (l+R2) + i2 
- 3E(TrC)/aA3 + Rl - 8(1 +R2J + i3 
+ Rl - 8(l +R2) + 
.4 
+ ai4;aA4 · A4 1 
+ Rl 8(1 +R2J + 
.5 
1 + di 5 ;aA5 ·As 
s c 2 - ar2 ;aL • L - r 2 2 
3 
{ (1 +Rzl l: A. - L - N} + (1 +R2)A4 + (1 +R2JA5 - Lz j=l J 1 
= 0 
= 0 
= 0 
= 0 
= 0 
= 0 
= 0 
0> 
lN 
Table 3. Transfonnation of the Euler first order condi tionsa 
aE(TrC)/aA2 + ~ - S(l+R7 ) + i 7 
- aE(TrC)/aA3 + R1 - B(l+R2) + i 3 
+ ·aE(TrC)/oA1 
.4 
+ 1 
+ R - S(l+R ) + i 5 1 2 
0 
0 
+ ai4/aA4 -A4 0 
+ Ois/aAs·As 0 
s ? 2 
3 
- 7 2 
- r- - C - or /:lL2 { (1 +R2) . l: A. - L1 - N} - ar-/oL2 (1 +R2)A4 - :l r /dL2 (1 +R2)A5 = 0 J=l J 
~1e first equation in Table 2 is solved for S(l+R2) and substituted into the fourth equation, The seventh equation in Tabl e 2 is solved for L2 and substituted into the sixth equation. 
0> 
..,. 
Table 4. ~laximization conditions expressed as a function of the rates of interest 
i2 aE(TrC)/aA2 - R1 + S(l +R,) 
i3 = aE (TrC) /aA3 - R1 + S (1 +R2) 
.4 
= aE(TrC)/aA1 1 
.5 
= 1 - R1 + S(l +R2) 
2 
= s r 
ai 4/aA4·A4 
ar2 /oL2 ·A4 
- ai 5;aA ·A 5 5 
2 2 3 -
or /oL2·A5 - C - or /oL2{((l+R2) .r A.) -L1 - N + RzA4 + R2A5} J=l J 
0> 
"' 
and liabilities are the exogenous variables. Additional exogenous 
variables are~, (l+R2), C, and N. In its structural form the para-
meters of the endogenous variables is the identity matrix. The para-
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meters of the reduced form of the system of simultaneous equations is the 
negative of the parameters of exogenous variables in the structural sys-
tern. Both the order and rank conditions for identification are met. The 
model is overidentified due to constraints that are placed on the para-
meters of the structural system: first, the parameters of the endogenous 
variables are constrained to be zero or one in the equation in which they 
appear; second, the coefficient of R1 is constrained to -1 in the first, 
second, and fourth equations; third, the coefficient s of (l+R2) are 
equal in the first, second, and fourth equat ions and they are all equal 
to the intercept term in the fifth equat ion; and fourth, the coefficients 
of A4 , A5, and the last exogenous variable in the fifth equation are all 
equal. Therefore , the system is a constrained system of simultaneous 
equations . 
Through a series of albegraic reductions the system can be simpli-
fied. '111e constraints on the coefficients can be used to define new 
variables. When two endogenous variables are combined the result is an 
endogenous variable. When two exogenous variables are combined the 
result is an exogenous variable. When an endogenous and an exogenous 
variable are combined the result is an endogenous variable. 66 
66Henri Theil, Princiales of Econometrics (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc., 1971), p. 92. 
3E(TrC)/3A 
1 
Defining one nc~< exogenous variable and one endogenous variable . 
. 5 2 
+ C) Y2 l + Rl R2(r 
5 
DL R2 ( (1 +R2) I A. Ll N) j=l J 
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(36) 
(37 ) 
(38) 
(39) 
The system of equations that i s estimated using two stage least squares 
is: 
(40) 
Y2 s 
The equations of system (40) are behavioral relations for the profit 
maximizing banker. Observations on a single bank over time would all ow 
the estimation of the slopes of the demand for loans (ai5/aA5), the 
slope of the demand fo r state and local funds (ai4/aA4), and the slope of 
2 the tune deposit supply (ar /3L2). However, over any extended per iod of 
time one would expect these demand curves t o be relatively unstable. 
Another approach would be to use cross- sectional observations on hanks 
that are expected to have identical demand functions . Here banks can be 
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classified according to characteristics of the markets within which they 
operate. The slope parameters of the supply and demand equations can 
be estimated from observations on the banks of a given class. This 
second approach 1vill be employed in this study. 
The expected profits function (equation (32)) assumes that all the 
ilssets in a class (e.g., loans) earn the same rate of interest. How-
ever , from observed data on a bank's portfolio each asset will earn the 
current rate at the time that the security was purchased by the hank. 
Interest earned on a class of assets is a weighted average of past rates 
of interest. The rationale applies to time deposits. Interest paid on 
time deposits is a weighted average of past rates depending on the 
maturity mix of the debt issues. Is the weighted average of past rates 
or is the current rate of interest the appropriate decision variable for 
the banker? In an effort to answer this question the results of the 
cross -sectional estimation of the slope parameters will be corroborated 
hy applying first difference data to equation system (40). The first 
di ffcrence of the interest data will rrore closely reflect the current 
market rate than the weighted average of past rates of interest. 
The data 
1he nnst desirable source of data for this type of study would be 
observations on individual banks from a variety of economic regions. 
However, while it is possible to obtain balance sheet data of this type, 
interest and income data is held in the strictest confidence and i s 
difficult to obtain. 
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Therefore, a secondary data source is used. The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) publishes balance sheet, interest, and 
income data by standard economic area. 67 The Bureau of the Census des-
cribes a standard economic area (SEA) "as a county or a group of counties 
\vi thin a state, which are homogeneous in general livelihood and socio-
economic characteristics. "68 TI1e FDIC and Census definitions differ in 
areas where there is a significant overlapping of banking services. In 
those states where branch banking is preval ent, the FDIC does not 
delineate SEA's. Since both SEA definitions are based on counties, 
uiscrcpancics can be accounted for and Census data can be made compatible 
with l'DJC definitions. 
The aggregate banking data for each SFA will be considered an 
observation on an individual bank . This t ype of aggregation is justi-
f iable when there are no economies of scale with respect to the volume 
of assets or liabilities. Benston's work has indicated that economies 
of scale are relevant when the size of individual accounts increases, 
but not necessarily when the dollar volume of accounts increases. 69 
Since SEAs with different market conditions will be considered separately , 
wi.thin a given bank class it is assuned that there arc no significant 
uifferenccs in the size of accounts. 
·I he usc of aggregate bank data necessi tatcs a normal izati.on of the 
data so SEAs of uifferent sizes may be compared. SEAs may d.i(fer in 
6 7 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, =B-'::a-:cnk.,..~=-::-=-::-2':':::-'-',.,.,....nc---
1970 (Washington, D.C . : Federal Deposit Insurance 
68 Ibid., p. 2. 
69
ceorge Benston, "Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in 
Banking," pp. 540-541. 
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size because the number of banks within each SEA differ and because the 
size of banks beuveen SEAs may differ. Three distinct methods of 
normalization wil l be used: (1) each asset and liability is expressed 
as a percent of total assets; (2) assets and liabilities are given for 
the average bank in the SEA; and (3) assets and liabilities are ex -
pressed on a per capita basis within the SFA. 
In order to apply cross sectional data to the system expressed in 
equation (40) it is necessary to observe banks which would be expected 
to have similar loan demand and deposit supply functions. Similarity 
of demand and supply functions can be discussed at two levels; the 
industry and the fi rm. Each banking market defines an industry within 
which several banks may compete. Some banking markets may be expected 
to di f fer from others and, therefore, the banks within the respective 
markets woul d be expected to have different deposit supply and loan de-
mand functions. For instance, in an agricultural community the principle 
borrowers are farmers. They borrow to meet the needs of the farm, which 
are seasonal and subject to the whims of the weather. The elasticity 
of demand for loans from farmers depends on the production function and 
the expected demand for crops. On the other hand the banks in an 
industrial area are faced with an entirely different set of borrowers 
seeking loans for entirely different reasons. Tn these two hanking mar-
kets t he loan clcrnand function for the market may he expected to d:iffer. 
A.ltcrnativc1y, at the level of the firm agricultural areas nrc gcncrnlly 
rural and can be characterized by the average distance the prospective 
customers live from their banking alternatives. Because of the greater 
anticipated distance from customer to banking alternative in an agri-
cultural area, one would expect the firm to have a more inelastic de-
posit suppl y and l oan demand func tion than a bank in an industrial 
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area where the proximity of competitive banking services is much greater. 
At the level of the industry the income of peopl e in the banking 
market may affect the industry demand for loans and Sl~ply of deposits. 
f'eople with higher incomes have a t endency to save more than people 
with lower incomes. People with higher incomes will tend to borrow a 
larger amount of funds for larger projects than people with lower in-
comes. At the level of the firm people with higher income will have a 
broader range of opportunities for seeking banking services than people 
with lower income . If a bank ' s customers have lower income one would 
expect the loan demand and deposit supply to be more inelastic than for 
a bank with more affluent customers. 
At the level of the firm the number of banking competitor ' s may be 
expected to affect the elasticities of loan demand and deposjt supply. 
A bank with fewer competitors would be expected to have more inelastic 
demand and supply functions . 
The banks in the sample will be divided into eight different 
cl asses, on the presumption that banks within each class will experience 
approximately the same demand and supply functions. Three criteria will 
be used to categorize banks: (1) Economic base of the banking market 
(agricultural or non-agricultural): An index of the ratio of agri-
cultural en~loymcnt to total employment for the hank.tng market divided 
by the same ratio for the nation is used to classify a market as 
agr icul tural or non-agricultural. If the index is greater than one 
the area is cl assified as agricultural; otherwise nonagricultural. 
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. . . d d . b 70 George Kaufman uses a S1ffillar rat1o as a eman var1a le. Eric Brucker 
uses a loan mix variable (ratio of agricultural loans to total loans). 71 
Both Brucker and Kaufman use these variables in the specification of 
demand functions. The approach in this paper is to separate banks accord-
ing to these characteristics, rather than to incorporate the ratios into 
the demand function. (2) Income of the banking market: an index of 
per capita income similar to the economic base index is used to divide 
banking markets into "rich" markets and "poor" markets . Brucker, in his 
attempt to estimate structural variables (loan/asset ratios and elas-
ticity of loan demand) includes an income variable to "enable the sepa-
ration of poor regions from rich regions."72 Likewise, Kaufman includes 
income as a demand variable. (3) Bank density: Banks are classified 
according to the number of banks per capita within the appropriate 
banking market. An index is calculated using the ratio of the market 
density to the national average. Both Brucker and Kaufman use this 
index as a structural variable. 
1nc f-DIC delineates 289 SEA's in thirty-four states. The remaining 
states were not subdivided into SEA's since extensive branch banking 
would n~ke the disaggregated data meaningless. Table 5 depicts the 
division of SEA's into eight classes; four agricultural and four non-
agricultural. /\s shown, the breakdown on the density and income i.ndi.ccs 
differ between the agricultural and non-agricultural communities. 
70Georgc Kaufman, "Bank Market Structure," pp . 433-435 . 
71Eric Brucker, "Banking Competit ion," p. 1140. 
72
rbid ., p. 1138. 
Table 5. Standard economic area classification 
Bank 
class 
1 
3 
4 
6 
8 
!\'umber of 
observations 
14 
71 
20 
20 
23 
29 
65 
.J-
Economic base 
non-agricultural index < 1 
non-agricultural index < 1 
non-agricultural index< 1 
non-agricultural index < 1 
agricultural index > 1 
agricultural index > 1 
agricultural index > 1 
agricultural index > 1 
Bank density 
low density index< .S 
l ow density index < . 5 
high density index> . 5 
high density index> .5 
low density index < 1 
low density index < 1 
high density index > 1 
high density index > 1 
Income 
poor index < 1 
rich index > 1 
poor index < 1 
rich index > 1 
poor index< .93 
rich index> .93 
poor index< .93 
rich index > .93 
-.._, 
LN 
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The reason for this is that the density on a per capita basis is on the 
average higher in rural communities due to lower population. Similarly, 
average i ncome percapi t a is higher i n nonagricultural areas. Therefore, 
if the densi t y index is less than .5 in the nonagricul tural community, 
the SEA .i s consider ed one of low bank density . If the income index is 
less t han .93 in the agricultural community , the SEA is considered a 
poor region. 
Since the demarcat i on bet~<~een bank classes is some~<~hat arbitrary 
an attempt is made to illustr ate the significant differences between the 
classes. Table 6 shO\<Is the level of significance in the differences 
bet~<~een the average non- interest earning assets to total asset s ratios 
(R2) , the average non- interes t revenue to total assets ratios (R1), and 
t he non-interest cost to total assets ratios (C), between bank c lasses . 
A level of s l[,mificance of . l means that there is a 10 percent chance 
that the difference in the means between the t1<1o bank classes is clue t o 
random variation. The table indicat es that all bank classes are signifi-
cantly different in at l east one respect . Seven groups are signi ficantly 
different in only one respect. The remaining twenty combinations are 
significantly different in a t least two respects. Tl<lelve combinations 
are s ignificantl y different in all three respects . Therefore, it is 
concluded that the eight different bank classes represent different 
types of markets. 
Population, income, ;md workforce data i s taken from the 1970 
census. 
73 Where the SEA definitions of the Bureau of the Census differ 
73u.s. Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Census of 
Population-1970 Volume I - Characteristics of the Population 
(Wash1ngton, D.C.~overnment Pr1nt1ng Off1ce,) 1973). 
75 
Table 6. Level of significance in the differences between average 
non - interest earning assets to total assets ratios, 
non-interest cos t to total assets ratios, and non-
interes t revenue to total assets r atios between banks 
- -- ·= 
R2 - non-interest earning assets t o total assets 
Bank 
cl ass 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0 
2 .1 0 
3 .00 5 .005 0 
4 .005 0 
5 .00 5 . 005 . 005 0 
6 . 05 .05 .1 .05 0 
7 .005 .005 .005 .005 . 005 . 005 0 
8 . 005 .005 .005 .005 .05 . 005 0 
R1 - non - interest revenue to total assets 
Bank 
~!~~~-- - -- ! _______ ? ______ _ ~-- - - -- --~- --- ----~ - -- -----~--- --- --? __ ___ __ §_ 
1 0 
2 0 
3 . 05 .005 0 
4 .1 .005 0 
5 .05 .005 .1 .005 0 
6 .05 . 005 .005 0 
7 .005 .005 .005 . 005 .005 0 
8 .005 .005 .1 .005 .005 .005 0 
C non-interest cost to total asse t s 
Bank 
cl as s 3 5 6 7 8 
------- --- ---- ------------- --- ------- --- ----- --------- -- --------- -- -----
1 0 
2 .05 () 
3 . 05 0 0 
4 . 1 0 
5 .05 0 
6 . 05 0 
7 .00 5 .05 .1 .1 0 
8 .005 .005 _oo5 .005 .0 5 . 005 0 
from FDIC definitions, county data is referred to and SEA data is ad-
justed to confonn with FDIC definitions. Interest data is reported by 
the FDIC in dollars of income earned on a class of assets or paid on 
a class of deposits. This data is converted to an interest rate by 
dividing the interest income by the volume of the asset held by the 
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bank on the balance sheet date, ignoring the distortion caused by the 
fluctuations in asset holding over the year. 74 Therefore, the interest 
rate is a weighted average of interest rates charged this year and in 
past years. Assets and liabilities are also reported in dol l ar figures. 
To allow the comparison of banks of different sizes these data are con -
verted to percentages of total assets. When profits are calculated from 
these data, they are normalized profits. To get actua l profits one 
nJUst multiply by the total expected assets of the bank . 
74
see Chapter V, p. 81. 
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CHAPTER V 
11-!E EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter explores several alternatives for estimating the para-
meters of the system of equations (40) . In order to compare banks of 
different sizes it is necessary to normalize the data. Three distinct 
procedures are used. The first approach is to use data which expresses 
assets and liabilities as a percent of total assets. Second, each 
observation i s treated as the average bank in the SEA. Third, assets 
and liabilities are expressed in terms of the dollars of assets per 
capita in the banking market. The parameters of equation system (40) 
are the slopes of the demand for state and local funds, the demand for 
loans, and the suppl y of time deposits. Estimates of these parameters 
are used to estimate the elasticity of demand for state and local funds, 
the elasticity of demand for loans, and the elas ticity of time deposit 
supply. These elasticities are used as an ordinal measure of monopoly 
or monopsony power. In addition, an attempt to focus on the impact of 
the current rates of interes t is made by using the firs t difference be-
tween 1970 observations and 1969 observations of assets, liabilities, 
and rates of interest. 
Assets anu .I iabilities as a 
percent of total assets 
Table 7 sumnarizes the results of a two stage l east squares est i -
mation of the parameters of equation syst em ( 40) for eight bank classes. 
Table 7. Two stage least squares analysis of eight bank classes using cross sectional data with 
assets and liabilities as a percent of total assets 
Bank 
class 
3 
4 
i 4 = .0322 
(.0091) 
y = .0658 2 (.0288) 
.4 
= .0423 1 
( .0019) 
y2 = .0816 (. 0072) 
.4 
= • 0390 1 
(.0037) 
v = 0747 
'
2 c:o2:m 
.-l 
= .0468 1 
(.00-\8) 
y, = .0797 
- (. 0163) 
ai 4/aA4 
+ .OSlO A4 (.0693 
b 
.0282 A4 (.0139) 
.0122 A4 (. 027S) 
b 
.0508 A4 ( .0358) 
ai 5 ;aA5 
2 ar ;aL2 
+ .0110 A5 + .8 229 DL (.OSS3) ( .6489) 
.0010 As .1303 DL 
(.0129) (.1230) 
.0184 As + . 7740b DL 
(.OSOO) (. S761) 
.o1ss As + .SS29b DL 
( .0331) (.3S64) 
R2 
.0431 
.1437 
OS62 
.0168 
.0109 
.0990 
.1 009 
.1243 
Degrees of 
freedom 
(1,12) 
(2 ,11) 
(1,69) 
(2,68) 
(1,18) 
( 2 ,1 7) 
(l ,18) 
(2 ,17) 
F 
.S41 
. 923 
4.111 
.S81 
.198 
.934 
2.019 
1. 206 
---- -------- ---- ----- ---------- -- --- ------------ ---- ------------------- -------------------------- -- ----- ---- ~ 00 
Table 7. 
Bank 
class 
s 
6 
8 
Cont inued 
.4 ; .0424 l 
(.0029) 
Yz ; .os7s 
(.0094) 
.4 ; .0335 l 
(.0038) 
y7 ; .0825 
- (.0139) 
i 4 ; .0401 
( . 0023) 
y2 ; .0670 ( . 011S) 
.4 ; .OH3 l 
( .0030) 
y2 ; .0806 ( .0116) 
+ 
ai 4;aA4 
a 
. 0274 A4 (.0208) 
.0326 A4 ( . 028S) 
.OlS8 A4 ( . 0186) 
. o2s2 As 
(. 0259) 
ais/aAs ar 2;ar.2 
R2 
Degrees of 
freedom F 
.0764 (l '21) l. 737 
- .02S6a As + .3364a DL .l2SS (2 , 20) l.43S 
(.0191) (.2474) 
.0463 (l '27) l. 312 
.0254 As + .S408b DL .1197 (2,26) l. 767 
(. 0283) ( . 2879) 
.0113 (l ,63) . 722 
+ .0173 AS + .2221 DL 
(.0239) (.2414) 
.0293 (2,62) .935 
.0206 (l ,4S ) .948 
- .0066 As .1261 DL .OlS2 (2 '4 4) 
(. 0226) (.1773) 
. 339 
aSignificru1t at d1e 90 percent level, using the students t-statistic ru1d recognizing tl1at it is only a 
proxy for the appropriate test statistic for simultru1eous equations. 
bSignifie<ult at tile 9S percent level. 
__, 
"' 
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Data which express assets and liabilities as a percent of total assets 
are used. In all cases the R2 is relatively low, but the parameter 
estimates appear to follow fue expected pattern. It is anticipated that 
the sign of ai4/aA4 in the f irst equation be negative. It is estimated 
as a negative value in all cases, except class l and class 6..' and in 
these cases the standard error of the estimate is high relative to the 
paran~ter estimate . The sign of ai 5/aA5 in the second eq~tion is ex-
pected to be negative. It is estimated as a negative value in all 
cases, except classes 1 and 7, where, again, the standard error of the 
estimate is high relative to the size of the parameter estimates. The 
sign of ar 2;aL2 in the second equation is expected to be positive. It 
i s estimated as a positive value in all cases, except classes 2 and 8, 
where , again the standard error of the estimate is relatively high. 'l11e 
fact that the parameter estimate has the expected sign does not imply 
that the bank class has a high degree of monopoly power, but only that 
the elasticity of demand may be less than infinity. The actual degree 
of monopoly should be measured by the elasticity of demand. 
Little is known about the small sample properties of the above 
es t imators . It is understood, however, for such systems of equations 
that the r: and t- sta tistics are not necessarily the appropriate test-
statistics. llowever, convention suggests that both the I' and the t be 
used as proxies for the appropriate test -statistics. lf the F-
statistic is a proxy for the appropriate t est-statistic , the est imated 
equations for classes 4, 5, and 6 have a .75 probability of explaining 
more than just the average variation in the endogenous variable. For 
classes 4, S, and 6 the t-statistic indicates that the slope of the 
deposit supply ftmction i s significantly different from zero. In 
classes 4 and 5 the slope of the demand for state and local funds is 
significantly different from zero. In class 5 the slope of the loan 
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demand is significantly different from zero . In the other bank classes 
one would conclude that the data does not exhibit monopoly power, since 
the slopes of the demand and supply functions are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero and this implies that the elasticities of supply and 
demand are not significantly different from infinity. 
There are a munber of possible explanations for the low R2s: 
(1) The use of aggregate bank data may incorporate spurious variation. 
Within each SEA size of banks extends over a wide range. 75 Aggregating 
bank data from banks of different sizes may produce a distorted variation, 
wi th the ac:t.ions of a small bank being overwhelmed by the actions of a 
large bank. (2) The interest rate calculations (interest earned 
divided by the volume of assets) may not reflect the current market rate. 
lf the current market rates are used, they affect bankers' decisions with 
regard to additions to the portfolio of assets, but not with regard to 
V1ose assets already in the port folio. (3) The use of asset and lia-
bility data implies that an additional constraint is placed on the data. 
1ne sum of the assets must equal one, as well as being equal to the sum 
of the liabilities and net worth. The expression of data in this form 
was necessary so that banks (SEAs) of different sizes may be compared. 
The additional constraint may cause a downward bias in the value of R2. 
75
'Ihe FDIC: data may be disaggregated into banks of different sizes 
on a s tatelvide basis, but not for an individual s t andard economic area. 
Therefore , it is not possible to accurately estimate the range of bank 
s i zes within an SEA. 
Assets and liabilities for the 
average baiik m tll'i SEA 
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Instead of normalizing assets and liabilities with respec t to total 
assets, the dat a for the SEA may be converted to an average volume of 
assets and liabilities by dividing SEA assets and liabilities by the 
number of banks in the SEA. The use of average bank data implies that 
one would expect the size of al l banks within a class to be the same. 
Using the aggregated data for an SEA i s valid if all banks within the 
SEA are the same s ize, so that the aggregate bank data reflect s an 
observation on a single bank. 76 Using arerage bank data to estimate 
the parameters of demand and supply functions for a bank cl ass , implies 
tl1at the bank sizes within each class, as well as within each SEA, ar e 
expected to be the same for all banks. 
Table 8 presents the results of two stage least squares estimation 
of equation sys t em (40) where average bank data for each SEA are used . 
Again using the F-statistic, the first equations for bank c lasses 3, 4, 
5, and 6 have a .90 probability of explaining more than just the average 
variation in the endogenous variable. The second equation is signifi-
cant at the . 75 level for class 3, the . 90 level for class 4, and the 
.SO l eve l for classes 5 and 6. These four bank classes appear to ex-
hibit some degree of monopsony or monopoly power. Based on the t-
statistic , recognizing its limitations, the parameter estimates of some 
of the variab l es are significantly different f rom zero, with the standard 
error less by some multiple than the estimated value of t he coeffi cients . 
It is interesting to note that this analysis does not find the slope of 
the loan demanu function (ai 5;aA5) in class 5 to be different from zero. 
76
see Chapter IV, p. 70. 
Tabl e 8. n;o stage least squares analysis of eight bank classes using average assets and liabilities per bank 
Bank 
class 
l 
2 
3 
4 
<li 4/3A4 
i 4 = .0369 + .00000034 A 
(. 0044) ( .00000080) 4 
y2 = .0806 ( .0048) 
.4 
1 = . 0384 + . 00000002 A4 (.0006) (.000000-3) 
Y2 = .0786 ( . 0007) 
.4 
= .0402 1 
(. OOlS) 
y2 = .0829 (. 0050) 
-
i 4 = ,04S1 -
( . 0290) 
Y2 = .0716 (. OOSO) 
.000001SlbA4 (. 00000071) 
.00000158bA4 (. 00000084) 
<lis /<lAs 2 <lr /312 
- . 00000049 AS + .00002 323 DL 
(.0000004S) (.000014S) 
+ .00000003 A5 - .00000075 DL (. 00000003) ( .00000084) 
- .00000184aAS + . 0000358 DL 
(. 00000118) (. 0000392) 
- . 00000018 As + . 0000285b DL 
( . OOOOOOSl) ( . 0000138) 
R2 
.0141 
. 2067 
.0049 
.0019 
. 2002 
.1S 72 
.1637 
.26S8 
Degrees of 
freedom 
(l ,12) 
(2,11) 
(1 ,69) 
(2 ,68) 
(1 '18) 
(2 '17) 
(1,18) 
(2,17) 
F 
. 171 
1.433 
.340 
. 411 
4 . S04 
1.S8S 
3. S23 
3. 077 
00 
"' 
Table 8. 
Bank 
class 
s 
6 
7 
8 
Cont inued 
. 4 
= .0418 1 
( .0019) 
y2 = . o7so (.0040) 
.4 
1 = . 0- 27 
(.0076) 
y2 = .0751 (.0036) 
.4 
1 = .0393 
(.0013) 
y2 = .0790 (.0033) 
-
ai4/aA4 
. 00000145al\4 
( 0 00000083) 
. 0000018Sb A4 
( 0 00000076) 
.00000116 A4 (. 00000121) 
i 4 = .0377 + .00000059 A4 (.0010) ( .00000068) 
y2 = .0748 (. 0021) 
ais /aAs 2 R2 
Degrees of 
or /aL2 freedom F 
.1269 (1, 21) 3. 052 
+ • ooooooo1 As + .0000187 DL . 0883 (2 . 20) . 968 
(. 00000063) (. 0000178) 
. 1169 (1, 21) 2. 779 
+ .00000008 AS + .0000152 DL 
( .OOOOOOS6) (. OOOOlSS) 
(2,20) .947 .0865 
.0114 (1,63) . 920 
.00000072 A5 + .0000236 DL ( . 00000120) (.0000313) 
(2. 63) 0 287 .0092 
.0166 (1,4S) .7S 7 
+ .00000017 As - .00000017 DL 
(.00000068) ( _00001 788) 
(2,44) .112 .0051 
aSignificant at the 90 percent level, using the students t- s tatistic and recognizing that it is only a 
proA~ for the appropriate test statistic for ~multaneous equations. 
bSignificant at the 95 percent level. 
00 
... 
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1ne analysis of Table 7 finds the value of this parameter to be negative 
and significantly different from zero. Likewise, in class 6 the value of 
the slope of the loan demand function is estimated as a positive value, 
where the previous analysis had estimated it to be negative . Also, for 
class 6 the estimate of ai4/aA4 is negative and significantly different 
from zero, where the analysis of data ecpressing assets as a percent of 
total assets estimates the parameter to be positive. All of these 
discrepancies may be due to a wide variation in bank size within each 
bank class. Estimates of ai4/aA4 and ai
5;aA5 for bank class 3 are 
significantly different from zero, which reinforces the results of the 
previous case. 
Assets and liabilities per 
capl ta m the SEA 
To avoid making the assumption about the identical size of banks 
for all SEAs in a bank class, the following approach is taken. The 
bank data is normalized by the number of people in the SEA. This im-
plies that a certain amount of banking service (assets per capita) is 
provided for each person in the banking market and that increasing the 
number of people in the SEll will proportionately increase the demand for 
banking services . 
Table 9 presents the results of two stage least squares estimation 
of equation system (40) using bank data per capita. Using the F-
statistic, the probability that the first equation explains more than 
just the average variation in the endogenous variable is .90 in classes 
4 and 5 and .75 in class 3. The probability that the second equation 
explains more than just the average variation in the endogenous variable 
Table 9. TNo stage least squares analysis of eight bank classes using average per capita assets and 
liabilities in the bank marketing area 
Bank 
ai4/aA4 class 
1 i = .0423 - . OOS2 A4 ( . 0058) ( . 0081) 
Yz = .0909 
(.0071) 
2 4 i = .0399 - .0016 A 
( .0013) (.0014) 4 
\' = • 0790 
. 
2 ( .0017) 
3 .-l = .0401 a l - . 0042 A4 (. 0020) (. 0029) 
y = .09S3 
'
2 (.0061) 
4 -4 = .0459 b l - .0071 A4 ( . 0032) ( . 0037) 
y7 = .0747 
- ( . 0066) 
ai 5/aAs 
a 
- .oos8 As 
(. 0036) 
+ .ooo3 As 
(. 0008) 
b 
- .o1o9 As 
(. 003S) 
- .oon As 
(. 0029) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ar
2 /aL2 
.1147 DL 
( .111 7) 
.0117 DL 
( . 0179) 
.13S6a DL 
( .0916) 
.0913a DL 
(. 0571) 
R2 
Degrees of 
f reedom 
.032S (1,12) 
.1961 (2 ,11 ) 
. 0169 (1,69) 
.0093 (2 ,68) 
.101S (1,18) 
. 4083 (2 ,1 7) 
.1720 (1,18) 
.1469 (2, 17) 
F 
.40S 
l. 342 
1.185 
. 30S 
2.033 
S.865 
3. 739 
1.464 
00 
a-
Table 9. 
Bank 
class 
s 
6 
7 
8 
Continued 
.4 
= .0420 l 
(.0022) 
y2 = .081S (.OOSl) 
.4 
= .0364 l + 
(.0031) 
y7 = .076S 
- (.0061) 
.4 
l = .0378 + 
(.0019) 
y2 = .08S3 (.0036) 
.4 
= .0376 l 
(.0006) 
y, = .07S3 
(. 0012) 
+ 
ai 4/aA4 
a 
.0049 A4 ( . 0031) 
.0017 A4 ( . 0039) 
.0004 A4 (. 0026) 
b 
.0008 A4 (.0004) 
ais/aAs ar 2/ aL2 
Rz Degrees of freedom 
.1032 (1 ,21) 
- .oo29 As + .0708a DL .0803 (2 , 20) 
(.0026) ( . OSSS) 
.0067 (1, 2 7) 
- .0018 As + .07323 DL .092S (2 ,26) 
(.0021) (. 04 SO) 
.ooos (1 ,63) 
b 
- .oo31 As 
(. 0013) 
+ .0316 DL 
c. 040 3) 
.0868 (2,62) 
.lOOS (1,4S) 
+ .ooo3 As .0083 DL 
(. 0007) ( .0248) 
.0038 (2,44) 
aSignificant at the 90 percent level, using the students t-statistic and recognizing that it is only 
a prox·y for the appropriate test statistic for 5Lmultaneous equations. 
bSigniftcanr at the 95 percent level. 
F 
2. 41S 
.873 
.183 
1. 32S 
.029 
2.94S 
S.026 
.084 
00 
....., 
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is .975 in class 3, .75 in classes 4 and 6, and .SO in class 5. The 
estimates 
estimates 
mates for 
of ai4/aA4 is negative, except for classes 6, 7, and 8. The 
for ai 5/aA5 are positive only for classes 2 and 8. The esti-
2 
ar /aL2 are negative only for classes 2 and 8. Equations (40) 
do not explain the data for classes 2 and 8. Class 2 is nonagricultural, 
high income, and low bank density. It is also highly urban. Ninety-
six percent of the SEAs in class 2 contain a standard metropolitan statis-
tical area. 1hese are not the conditions under which one would expect 
to find bank monopoly or monopsony power. Bank class 8 is agricultural , 
high income, and high bank densi ty. Even though it is rural (only 6 per-
cent of the SEA's contain standard metropolitan statistical areas) , the 
high income and high bank density would lead one to expect a more com-
petitive market. 
lstimation of elasticities 
Using the three methods of expressing assets and liabilities some 
of the bank classes appear to exhibit some degree of monopoly or monop-
sony power, with the s lope parameters significantly different from zero 
(using the t-statistic as a proxy for the appropriate test-statistic). 
However, the best measure of monopoly power is not the slope of the de-
mand function, but the Lerner index or the elasticity of demand. Be-
cause the F-statistics are consistently higher for the third method of 
normalizing assets and liabilities, the parameter estimates from assets 
and liabilities per capita are used to estimate elasticity. 
Table 10 present s estimates of elasticities of demand and supply 
hased on the parameter estimates in Table 9. i\n elasti.city is cal culated 
for each SEA in the bank class and all elasticities within the class are 
Table 10 0 Average estimated elasticities of demand for s t ate and local funds and loans and elasticity 
of time deposit supply by bank class based on estimates of demand and supply parameters 
using per capita assets and liabilities 
Bank State and local funds Loans Time de~si ts 
class Estimated Upper a Lower a Estimated Upper a Lower a Estimated Upper a Lower 
1 -12o37 -2202 -504 -Sol7b -7 07 -300 ol8 o30 oll ~o8)c ~-3o2) ""(0:9, 0 1 0) 
2 -36 0 59 -16907 -1403 7008 13200 19 00 -1.62 -6o65 -076 
~5,-19o5) ~9o3) ~o 6) 
3 -14 o75b -3700 -8o7 -2 o84b -707 -1.4 ol4b o35 o08 
"(=4'/.7,-807) ~-2 o 2) ~010) 
4 -8o 24b -2505 -309 -23013 -41.3 -1304 02ob o32 o10 
( -1702 ,- 504) l-0o4) ~13) 
5 -1 2o98b -29ol -7 07 -10 0 92 -15o3 -7 0 2 o30b o39 0 21 
nn,-8oo) ~7,-So8) ~16) 
a 
00 
10 
Table 10. Continued 
Bank State and local funds 
class Estimated Uppera Lower a 
6 30.03 39.3 19. 0 
~) 
128.80 251 .l 78.5 
~oo) 
8 62.86b 126.3 6.2 
T41.9,125 . 6) 
Loans 
Estimated Uppera Lowera 
-12 .83 (-oo,-5. 9) -20.1 
-8.3 
-8 .63b -15.1 -5.4 
l-14.9,-6.1) 
72 . 6 ~oo) 110.6 9.2 
Time deposits 
Estimated Uppera 
.Zlb 
"[:34,.13) 
. 56 
D5,oo) 
-1.64 
~.40) 
.29 
. 84 
-2.6 
Lower a 
.13 
. 34 
-.17 
~e estimated elasticity is calculated by dividing the slope of the demand or suppl y function into the 
ratio of interest rate to volume of the asset or liability for each SEA and averaging for all SEA's in 
a bank class. The upper figure is the highest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class and the lo1ver figure 
is the lowest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class. 
bBased on parameter estimates which the "t-statistic" indicat es are significantly different from zero . 
cln order to indicate a range of possible elasticity estimates elasticities were calculated for values 
of the parameter that are one standard deviation above and below the estimat ed parameter value . 
\D 
0 
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averaged to yield an estimated elasticity for the bank class. Table 10 
also indicates the high and lo1v elasticity for SEAs in each bank class. 
The upper and lower elasticities represent a range of estimates el as -
ticities within a bank class, but it does not represent a confidence 
interval. Without knowing the exact di stribution of the parameter es ti -
mates it is impossible to est ablish a confidence interval for the esti-
mated elasticity . However, a range over which the estimates may be con-
sidered reliable may be established by calculating the elasticities for 
values of the parameters that are one standard deviation above and 
below the estimated value of the parameter. For instance, the es timated 
average elasticity of demand for state and local funds in bank class l 
i s -12.37 . In bank class 1 the lowest el as ticity for an SEA i s es timated 
at -5 .4 and the highest i s -22.2 . 1f the parameter va l ue was one s tand -
ard deviation less than its est imated value, the elastici ty of demand 
would have risen to infinity; if the parameter were one s tandard devi-
ation more , the elasticity would be -4. 8. The elasticity estimate , 
though low, is not significantly different from infinity . 
The Lerner i ndex is an ordinal ranking device. If the absolut e 
value of elasticity of demand is l ower for one bank than another , then 
it may be said that the former has a higher degree of monopoly p01ver. 
llowever, the index cannot be used to measure monopoly power "ithout a 
reference point. J'or ease of exposition , an elasticity of 10 is arbi -
traril y chosen as a reference point. If the absolute value of the 
elasticity is less than 10 the bank is said to have monopoly power in 
a relative sense. If the elasticity i s gr eater than 10, the bank is 
said to be relatively non-monopolistic. 
The estimates of the elasticities of demand for state and local 
funds in al l cases are relatively high and could not be considered as 
representing monopoly power for the bank. Only in class 4 is the 
elasticity less than 10 . 
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The estimates of the elasticities of demand for loans are signifi-
cantly lower for the low income bank classes 1, 3, 5, and 7 (-5.17, 
-2.85, -10.92, and -8.63 respectively). For the high income bank 
classes the elasticity of loan demand is not significantly different 
from infinity. 
The es timates of the elasticities of deposit supply are all very 
small . lbwever, for classes 2, 7, and 8 the estimates are not signifi-
cantly different from infinity. The estimates in the other five classes 
are all less than one. These consistently low estimates of the elas-
ticity of time deposit supply are to be regarded as questionable. The 
inelastic supply may mean that . the bank has monopsony power. There is, 
however, another plausible explanation. That is, that regulation Q is 
i n effect putting a ceiling on the rate of interest paid on time de-
posits. If this is the case the bank will act as if its supply of de-
posit s is perfectly inelastic and the rate paid will be the maxinrum 
rate. The bank will be unable to attract more funds by paying a 
higher rate. The only way the bank could pay a higher rate would be 
to change the maturity mix of its deposits, and this would not 
necessarily attract more deposits. 
The period 1970 was chosen for the sample due to the relatively 
stable interest rates during the year . In the early part of the year 
interest rates were rising. In the latter part of the year they were 
falling. lt is fairly clear that regulation Q was an effective 
constraint at the beginning of 1970, since the Federal Reserve deemed 
it necessary to raise the maximum rates in January of 1970. 
As money -market rates skyrocketed during 1969 , commercial bank 
rates on time deposits r emained at their regulation Q ceilings 
and consequently, business and individual savers withdrew sub-
s tantial amount s of deposits from banks and placed those funds 
in other instruments wi th high rates of return. Although 
regulation Q ceilings were raised in January 1970, that change 
came too late to halt the heavy deposit outflow around the turn 
of the year , especially the outflow of large -denomination time 
certificates.?? 
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An interest rate survey for the last three months of 1970 indicates that 
rates paid on time deposits moved quickly to their new ceiling rates. 78 
Eighty-one percent of the banks were paying the ceiling rate on saving 
accounts . Ninety -seven percent of the banks were paying the ceiling 
rate on t ime account less t han twelve months less than $100,000. 
Ninety-one percent of t he banks were paying the ceiling rate on time 
accounts of one to two years. Ninety-five percent of the banks were 
paying the ceiling rate on time accounts of more than two years. Only 
for accounts of more than one year and more than $100,000 were a large 
number of banks paying l ess than the ceiling rate. 
First difference analysis 
In order to focus on the current rat e of interest the first dif-
fer ence of equation system (40) can be taken. Interest rates calcu -
lated by dividing interest earned on the cl ass of assets by the volume 
of the assets are weighted averages of past jnterest rates . Assuming 
that each asset earns its interest annually , the first difference 
77 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Monthly Review (April 1970), 
p. 96 . 
78 Federa l Reserve Bulletin (April 1971) , p. 375. 
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between interest earned in the current year and interest earned in the 
previous year is the interest earned on the newly acquired assets . 
. 4 .4 ~-4/'A (A70 A69) 1 70- 1 69 =-o1 0 4 4 - 4 
70 69 Yz -yz 
(41) 
When the first difference is taken the constant term drops out. If the 
demand equations are assumed to be stable from year to year at the opti-
mal solution (profit maximization according to the Euler first order 
conditions) one would expect the difference between the variables to be 
zero. In order to have a stock adjustment between 1969 and 1970 there 
must be a change in the supply and demand functions. If it is assumed 
that there is a trend change in the supply and demand functions, then 
there will be a stock adjustment which can be measured in terms of a 
modification in equation (41): 
(42) 
Here T represents the trend variable. It is assumed that this trend 
is such that the positions of the supply and demand functions change but 
that at the optunal solution the slopes of t he supply and demand func-
tions have not changed. 
The first difference anal ysis is made for classes 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
In the three methods of measuring assets and liabilities the F-
statistic indicated that equation system (40) appeared t o explain more 
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than average variation in the endogenous variables for these four cl asses 
of banks. Assets and liabilities are normalized on a per capita basis , 
since the F-statistic is consistently higher using this method than for 
the percent of total assets or the average bank data methods. 
Table 11 summarizes the r esul t s of two stage least squares esti-
mates of equation (42) using firs t difference of per capita bank data 
for four classes of banks. The parameter estimates for ar 2/aL2 are not 
s ignificantly different from zero in any of the bank classes. This im-
plies that there is no stock adjustment for t ime deposits, which i s 
reasonable since interest rates could be changed within the years time 
period for most of the deposits . Or if regulation Q is in effect 
interest rates won't change , there will be no trend associated with 
time deposits. Based on the F and t -st atistics , the es timates of all 
other paramet ers are significantly different from zero. 
Table 12 ca lculates the average elast icities for the four bank 
classes based on the parameter es timates . The es timated elasticities 
indicate that a monopoly model is of value in analyzing the short run 
activities of banks in these classes. Classes 3, 5, and 6 are essen-
tially rural areas; classes 3 and 5 are low income areas ; cl asses 5 and 6 
are low bank density areas; but class 4 is high i ncome , high bank den-
sity, nonagricultural, urban area. It is impossible to establi sh any 
decisive conclusions on the structural preconditions fo r the existence 
of monopoly power. 
Critique of the empirical analysis 
In evaluating the empirical evidence presented in this paper two 
specific questions should be asked: Does the empirical evidence support 
Table 11. T"o stage least squares analysis fo r four bank classes using first difference of average 
per capita assets and liabilities in the bank marketing area 
Bank 
class 
3 
4 
5 
6 
di 4 ; .0034 -
( .0011) 
dy2 ; .0081 
(.0015) 
di4 ; . 0034 
(.0008) 
dy2 ; .0074 
(.0020 
di4 ; .0050 -
( 0 0011 ) 
dy 2 ; .0069 
(.0019) 
di4 ; .0060 
(. 0018) 
dy2 ; .0053 
( 0 0013) 
3i4/3A4 
a 
.0114 dA4 
( .0085) 
b 
.0155 dA4 
( .0063) 
b 
.0205 dA4 
(.0091) 
.0314b dA4 
( 0 0132) 
ai 5;aA5 
2 R2 
Degrees of 
ar /3 L2 freedom 
.0906 (1 ,18) 
b 
.0035 dDL .4183 (2 ,1 7) - . 0145 dA5 (.0043) ( .0698) 
.2507 (1 ,18 ) 
b 
,0082 dDL (2 '17) - .01 44 dA5 - .4110 ( .0043) ( .0407) 
.1939 (1 ,21) 
b 
- . 0136 dA5 
( 0 0066) 
+ • 0010 dDL 
(.0048) 
.1737 (2,20) 
.1728 (1 '27) 
b 
.0116 dDL .14 29 (2,26) - .oo66 dA5 + 
( 0 0032) ( .0417) 
I' 
1.794 
6.113 
6.033 
5.930 
5.051 
2.103 
5.641 
2.167 
aSignificant at the 90 percent level, using the students t-statistic and recognizing that it is only a 
proxy for the appropriate test statistic for simultaneous equations. 
bSignificant at e1e 95 percent l evel. 
<.0 
a-
Table 12. Average estimated elasticities of demand for state and local fLmds and loans and elastici ty 
of time deposi t supply by bank class based on estiwEtes of parameter s using first difference 
of per capita assets and liabil ities 
Bank State and local funds Loans Time de12osits 
class Estimated Upper a Lower a Estimated Upper a Lower a Es timated Upper a Lower 
3 -5.38b -13.5 -3.1 -2 .l 3b - 5.8 -1.0 -5 .31 -13. 7 -3.0 
nr:z:--3.1) n:o,:-1.6) ~25) 
4 -3. nb -11.6 -1.8 -1. 73b -3 .1 -1.0 -2.24 -3 .6 -l. 2 
~2.7) TT.s,="l . 3) ~7) 
5 -3.10b -7 .0 -1.9 -2 . 30b -3.2 -l. 5 21.71 28.6 10. 9 
l-"S"T,- 2 .1) "[=4T, -1. 5) t:f."/,=) 
6 -l. 58b -8. 1 -1. 0 -3 .57b -5.6 -2.6 1.33 1. 9 .9 
T=T.7," -1. 4) T="D.9,- 2. 4) ~ 
aThe estimated elasticity is calculated by dividing the slope of the demand and supply function into 
the ratio of interest rate to volume of the asset or liability for each SEA and averaging for all 
SEA's in a bank class. The upper figure is the highest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class 
and the lower figure is the lowest elasticity for an SEA in the banking class . 
bBased on parameter estimates which the "t-statistic" indicates are significantly different from zero. 
cln order to indicate a range of possible elasticity estimates elasticities lvere calculated for values 
of the parameter that are one standard deviation above and below the estimated parameter value. 
a 
'"" " 
98 
the theoretical argument of monopoly power? Does the empirical evidence 
indicate that monopoly and monopsony power are of importance in the 
conunercial banking industry? 
In answer to the first ques t ion, the theoretical model is based 
on the profit maximizing motives of conunercial bankers . Asked the 
question, "Do bankers maximize profits?", a banker , would probably 
answer t hat they maximize ser vice to the community and in that process 
they may or may not maximize profits. "Do they act as if they are 
maximizing profits?" is ar. empirical question . "Is the service to the 
conununity that they maximize a function of the constraints of regu-
lation?" is al so an empirical question. All the estimations explain 
less than half of the total variation of the endogenous var i ables. One 
possible explanation is that bankers do not operate as profit maximizers. 
There is another more serious criticism of the theoretical model, 
and that is that the cal culus of the Eul er first order conditions is 
only defined where the functions are conti nuous. The existence of 
i nequality constraints, that are operative (e .g. r egulat ion Q or 
regulation H) if they are incorporated into the objective function may 
create a mathematical progranuning problem, rather than a problem of 
classical optimization . 
The t heoretical model also encounters problems with the appro-
priate definition of the interest rate. The interest rate used i s a 
weighted average of all past interest rates. The first difference of 
the weighted averages i s the current rate. The problem with this 
approach is that the maturity mix of asset and liability cat egories 
differs, and the adjustment of dlfferent cat egories to current market 
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rates will proceed at different paces. Under these conditions a dynamic 
stock-flow model would be more appropriated than the static stock model 
utilized in this paper. However, the data necessary on the maturity mix 
of bank portfolios is not available. 
Realizing the limitations of the theoretical model, does the 
empirical evidence indicate that monopoly power is a relevant consider-
ation in the commercial banking industry? The answer to this question 
has to be mitigated in light of the data source used in the empirical 
analysis. Aggregated bank data, while the best available source for a 
cross sectional study is full of all sorts of "noise." Individual bank 
data would have been more appropriate for the study. In spite of the 
weaknesses of the data some conclusions can be drawn. Table 10 indi-
cated that the elasticity of loan demand in low income areas was sub-
strultially below those in high income areas. Table 12 indicated that 
in four bank classes the adjustment for interest rate changes from year 
to year appears to be stmject to some degree of monopoly power. Due to 
the possible incursion of regulation Q into the analysis, no conclusions 
can be drawn with respect to the existence of monopsony power. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
'fhe commercial banking industry is often criticized on the grounds 
that there is a high concentration of market power in the hands of a 
few firms. However, the appropriate measure of market power is Lerner's 
index of monopoly power, not concentration. Lerner's index measures the 
difference between marginal cost and price as a percentage of the price. 
On the assumption that firms are profit maximizers (marginal costs equals 
marginal revenue) the index is the inverse of the elasticity of demand: 
the higher the elasticity of demand, the lower the index of monopoly 
power. The theoretical model developed in the paper is designed to per-
mit the estimation of demand elasticities in the banking industry. 
The theoretical model assumes that banks are profit maximizers. 
In his efforts to maximize profits the banker considers the cost of main-
taining and administering different assets (Cj(Aj)) and liabilities 
(Ck(~)) , the risk of default on different assets (DRj), transaction 
costs and market risks associated with deposit liability fluctuations 
(TrCj), the average and marginal revenue associated with each assets 
j (i Aj)' and the average and marginal cost associated with each 
k liability (r Lk). The banker maximizes an expected profits function: 
E(P) 
n . l~ (E(iJA) - E(Cj (A.)) - E(DR.) - E(TrC.)) 
j~l J J J J 
( 43) 
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where the expected values are based on the random variation of deposits 
and/or l oans . The expected profits function is maximized subject to 
the constraint that assets equal liabil i ties plus net worth. The bank 
adjusts its portfolio of assets and issues of liabilities in accordance 
with the Euler first order maximization conditions of the expected 
profits function. The Euler first order conditions specify the slopes of 
the asset demand functions and the liabil ity supply functions. 
The empirical model focuses its attention on the demand and supply 
conditions. Specifically , two assets (loans and state and loca l funds) 
and one liability (time deposits) are investigated. The prices of all 
other assets and liabilities are assumed to be determined in perfectly 
compet i t ive markets. If the elasticity of demand for loans or for state 
and local funds is low, the bank is said to have monopoly power . If 
the elasticity of time deposit supply is low, the bank is said to have 
monopsony power. In order t o estimate these elasticities, it is neces-
sary to make several simplifying assumptions: administrative cos t s are 
expressed as a proportion of total assets; default risks are ignored; 
and at the optimal solution of the Euler first order conditions trans-
action costs generated by deposit -l iability fluctuations are treated as 
scalars. The empirical expected profits function is : 
HPJ 
n 
>: 
j=l 
m 
' .· kL 
' r k k=l 
n 
c:c r. 1\.) 
j = I J 
E(TrC) ( 44) 
The liul er first order maximi za tion conditions of the above function die-
tates a set of behavi.oral equations for the profi t maximizing bank. 
1hese behavi oral equations C3n be used to esti~ate the slope of the loan 
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demand, the slope of the demand for state and local funds , and the slope 
of the time deposit suppl y function, which in turn can be used to esti-
mate the elasticities of the r especti ve functions. 
The empirical results are based on cross-sectional data for 289 
s tandard economic areas in those states where there is an absence of ex-
tensive branch banking. These observations are categorized into eight 
bank classes by per capita income level, by bank density per capita in 
the s tandard economic area , and by economic base (agricultural or non-
agricultural) of t he area. Thi s classification groups banks with similar 
market condit i ons together . It is assumed that banks experiencing simi-
lar market conditions will have identical demand and supply functions. 
The Euler first order condi t ions are used to estimate the slopes of the 
supply and derrand functions within each class of banks . The slope esti-
mates are then used to calculate an average elasticity for loan den~nd, 
state and local funds demand, and time deposit supply for each class of 
banks. 
In general, it can be concluded that those banks from low income 
areas have a lower elasticity of demand for loans than banks in high 
income areas. Table 10 gives the range of the estimates of loan demand 
elasticity in low income areas from -2.84 to -10.82; the range of the 
estimates for the high income areas is from -12.83 to oo. Banks in lower 
income areas have more monopoly power in the loan account. 
The elasticity associated with st ate and local funds is relatively 
high approximating a perfectly competitive market. The range of esti -
mated elasticities i s from -8.24 t o oo. For only one bank class (non-
agricultural, high bank densit y, and high income) i s the abso lute va lue 
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of the elasticity l ess than 10. All other dasses of banks have esti-
mates elasticities that would have to be considered consistent with 
perfectly competitive markets. 
The estimates of the elasticity of deposit supply is low for all 
classes of banks . For six classes of banks it is less than 1. This 
could be due to monopsony power, but it is more likely due to the legal 
ceiling on interest rates paid on time deposits (regulation Q). 
The data for two classes of banks do not appear t o be consistent 
with the en~irical rrodel of monopoly power. The class of banks repre-
senting nonagricultural areas with high income and high bank density 
per capita, which include s the major urban areas of the country, does 
not appear to exhibit a measurable degree of monopoly or monopsony 
power. Also, the rural class of banks from agricultural areas with 
high bank density and high income does not appear to exhibit any measur-
able degree of monopoly or monopsony power. One would not expect to 
f ind monopoly power i n either of these classes. In the former, even 
though bank density is low, financial markets are well developed and com-
munication among customers is good leading one to expect a perfectly 
competitive market. In the l atter bank class, the high incorr~ and high 
bank density would l ead one t o expect the perfectly competitive market, 
even though the area is rural . 
For selected bank classes a first difference analysis i s made of 
the Euler first order conditions . This is done in an effort to isolate 
the current market rate of mterest from past rates of interest. Inter-
est rates calculated by dividing interest earned by the volume of an 
asset in the portfolio arc weighted averages of past interest rates. 
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The first difference between any two years reflects the current interest 
rates in those years. This analysis did not indicate the presence of 
monopsony power and it is consistent with the implications of regulation 
Q. Monopoly power appears to be present especially in the loan account 
where t he range of estimated elasticities is from -1.73 to -3.57. The 
conclusion can be drawn that in the short run customers are reluctant 
or unable to switch banks. For a year to year change the bank exerts 
monopoly power over its loan demand. This conclusion can only apply to 
the short run. Over the longer period customers may have more alterna-
tives open to them. This analysis of first difference does not lead to 
any conclusions for the structural preconditions for the existence of 
monopoly power, but it does indicate that banks in certain markets may 
have some degree of monopoly power. 
A monopoly model of bank behavior explains some of the portfolio 
decisions of some banks . However, it i s not appropriate f or studying 
the behavior of all banks. Banks in well developed urban financial 
market s or rural markets with high income and high bank density are 
characterized by perfect competition. In other markets a monopoly 
model is useful in i nterpreting bank behavior . 
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